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ABSTRACT—Two terms ago, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment precludes ministers from bringing employment-related claims 
against their churches. In some ways, Hosanna-Tabor changed little. The 
lower courts had all reached that conclusion already, though the Supreme 
Court slightly expanded the breadth of the so-called ministerial exception. 
More important is how Hosanna-Tabor reconceptualized things, especially 
in how it pushed back somewhat against the Supreme Court’s imperial 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, where the Court had broadly 
held that the Free Exercise Clause did not entitle religious believers to 
exemptions from generally applicable laws. Hosanna-Tabor could end up 
an isolated anomaly, a peculiar concession to the importance of ministers 
and the intrusiveness of employment discrimination laws, a railroad ticket 
good for one day and train only. But the Court’s opinion speaks of a 
broader principle, a principle whose boundaries it consciously puts off 
defining. And it is striking how so many decisions in the lower courts fall 
within Hosanna-Tabor’s principle. From employment discrimination law 
to labor law, from contract to tort, lower courts regularly dismiss all 
manner of cases in ways incompatible with Smith and for reasons akin to 
those given in Hosanna-Tabor. This Article looks at that universe of cases, 
reflects on some patterns that emerge, and works toward an explanation for 
what is happening and how courts should handle these issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two terms ago, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court returned to religious liberty, holding 
that the First Amendment precludes ministers from bringing employment 
discrimination claims against their churches.1 Hosanna-Tabor’s holding 
was narrow, but its importance lies beyond its holding. Twenty years 
earlier, in Employment Division v. Smith,2 the Supreme Court held that the 
Free Exercise Clause did not entitle religious believers to exemptions from 
generally applicable laws.3 Hosanna-Tabor distinguished Smith, claiming 
that internal church matters were outside Smith’s reach.4 The Court drew 
this distinction from a string of early Supreme Court cases that had 
required courts to abstain from fights over church property. Hosanna-
Tabor reaffirmed those cases and repeated their statements of principle, but 
added little of its own in further explanation. 
Meanwhile, a curious development continues in lower courts across 
the country. All kinds of cases—from tort to contract, from labor law to 
corporate law—continue to be dismissed on grounds of religious liberty, 
despite Smith and for reasons somewhat akin to Hosanna-Tabor. Besides 
the ministerial exception, the most well-known example is that courts will 
not resolve claims of clergy malpractice.5 But these are just the two most 
salient and well-defined illustrations; ones less familiar and less tidy 
abound. The Connecticut Supreme Court recently dismissed the negligence 
 
1 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
2 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
3 Id. at 886 n.3 (“[G]enerally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a 
particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest . . . .”). 
4 See infra notes 56–70 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 140–44 and accompanying text. 
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claims of a woman who fell during a Catholic charismatic healing service.6 
The Texas Supreme Court recently dismissed a battery suit brought by a 
seventeen-year-old who claimed she was hurt during a church exorcism.7 
And whatever the principle here, it is not limited to tort. Courts have 
dismissed claims that a rabbi was fired without good cause as his contract 
required,8 or that a parent violated his prenuptial agreement by bringing his 
children to a Catholic Mass,9 or that the Southern Baptist Convention failed 
to follow its own rules when it confirmed its slate of national officers.10 
To be clear, these results are not all due to Hosanna-Tabor; most of 
these cases were decided before Hosanna-Tabor. And the reasoning in 
these cases rarely mirrors that of Hosanna-Tabor or its predecessor cases. 
With some important exceptions, these lower court opinions tend to be 
terse and unreflective—likely a product of state courts having too much on 
their plates. Some decisions cite only governing state court decisions; some 
cite little precedent at all. They certainly are not all consistent; indeed, their 
inconsistencies are glaring.11 But if the answer is that lower courts have 
been somehow inadvertently and imprecisely stumbling toward Hosanna-
Tabor, then that seems downright fascinating. 
The old model of the Free Exercise Clause involved disputes between 
the government on one side and a religious believer (or group) on the other. 
This is the classic paradigm of church and state taught in constitutional law 
classes, and here Smith reigns. The new model involves disputes between 
religious believers. These cases have always been around, and have always 
posed more trouble for courts. Hosanna-Tabor unquestionably means that 
the new model will be handled differently from the old one, but it leaves 
the details wide open. This Article aims to offer a theory for these new 
model cases, seeking to put more flesh on this idea of church autonomy. 
Part I of this Article examines the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC and the 
Court’s conception of church autonomy. Part II argues that the 
implementation of this principle requires a somewhat imprecise distinction 
 
6 See Kubala v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 43 A.3d 662, 662 (Conn. 2012). 
7 See Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008).  
8 See, e.g., Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654, 655 (2d Cir. 2009); see also infra 
note 207 (listing additional cases). 
9 See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1157–58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
10 See Crowder v. S. Baptist Convention, 828 F.2d 718, 726–27 (11th Cir. 1987). 
11 See 2 WILLIAM W. BASSETT ET AL., RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 10:1, at 10-8 
(2013) (“[T]he case law [regarding] the civil liability of religious organizations is not entirely 
consistent.”); Annotation, Liability of Churches or Other Religious Societies for Torts Causing 
Personal Injury or Death, 124 A.L.R. 814–15 (1940) (“The authorities upon the subject in hand are far 
from satisfactory and do not admit of the formulation of general rules.”); see also Richard W. Garnett, 
Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 515, 526 (2007) (arguing that “the ‘church autonomy’ doctrine is more of a grab-bag of 
precedents than a clear rule or prohibition”). 
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between two kinds of legal obligations—imposed ones (like tort and 
criminal law) and assumed ones (like contract or property). Part III 
examines church autonomy in the former area, while Part IV examines 
church autonomy in the latter. 
I. HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN  
CHURCH & SCHOOL V. EEOC 
Hosanna-Tabor began as a garden-variety dispute over the scope of 
the ministerial exception. Cheryl Perich taught fourth grade at a small 
religious school run by Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church.12 She 
was responsible for her students’ religious instruction, and she was also a 
commissioned minister in the national church, the Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod. After an escalating disagreement over when she would 
return from disability leave, the church removed Perich and she sued to get 
her job back. The lower courts disagreed over whether Perich’s job duties 
and ecclesiastical office were enough to put her within the ministerial 
exception.13 But in the Supreme Court, the dispute widened into whether 
the ministerial exception should exist at all. 
Two distinct lines of precedents converged in Hosanna-Tabor, with 
each side claiming its own as controlling. The first set of cases involved 
religious believers seeking exemptions from burdensome government 
regulation. The Supreme Court used to give exemptions in sufficiently 
sympathetic cases.14 But in 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith,15 the 
Supreme Court held that courts should generally not give exemptions if the 
law in question was neutral and generally applicable.16 The second line of 
cases involved internal religious disputes—two factions fighting over 
church property or a church officer disputing his removal. Here the Court’s 
position had been firm: Churches resolved their own conflicts, and courts 
did not interfere. Sometimes the prevailing law was generally applicable, 
but the Court never cared and sometimes did not seem to notice.17 Churches 
 
12 For the facts that follow, see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 
132 S. Ct. 694, 699–701 (2012). 
13 Compare EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881 
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (concluding that Perich was a minister and that her claims were barred), with EEOC 
v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that 
Perich was not a minister and that her claims were not barred). 
14 The Court used to ask whether burdens on religious liberty had been justified by a compelling 
governmental interest. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963). 
15 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
16 Id. at 886 n.3 (“[G]enerally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a 
particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest . . . .”). 
17 The dissenters noticed more often. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 
U.S. 696, 726 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the court for reversing the judgment of the 
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had the right to choose their officers, regardless of the usual principles of 
corporate or trust law.18 In a church split, courts could not give the property 
to the faction it believed closest to the church’s original beliefs, even if 
such a method was used to resolve disputes in nonreligious organizations.19 
Hosanna-Tabor fell into this second line of cases, in a sense. It, too, 
was a fight about the removal of a church officer. But the vitality of the 
second line of cases had been thrown into doubt by Smith. Smith had 
flattened them into a single cryptic sentence about how the government 
cannot get involved in “controversies over religious authority or dogma.”20 
The Solicitor General saw these cases as moribund anomalies, calling them 
simply “older cases concerning church-property disputes,”21 and dismissing 
them in stray sentences and footnotes.22 To employment lawyers, Hosanna-
Tabor involved an issue of great visceral importance, but little practical 
importance. Ministers make up a tiny fraction of the labor market; most 
employment law courses will probably not even cover Hosanna-Tabor. But 
church-and-state scholars knew from the start that, no matter which way it 
was decided, Hosanna-Tabor would remake the field. 
Though the Court surely did not find this case easy, its opinion does 
make it seem that way. Embedded within the second line of cases, the 
Court sees a clear, coherent, and powerful principle: “‘[R]eligious 
organizations [have] power to decide for themselves, free from state 
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and 
doctrine.’”23 Each has the “right to shape its own faith and mission through 
its appointments” without “government involvement in such ecclesiastical 
decisions.”24 Churches choose their leaders; the government does not 
interfere. And there is no hand-wringing about this, no discernible 
hesitation. The part of the opinion establishing the ministerial exception 
takes less than three pages.25 
 
state courts when those courts had decided the religious dispute “just as they would have attempted to 
decide a similar dispute among the members of any other voluntary association”). 
18 See id. (majority opinion) (barring the legal claims of a deposed bishop challenging his removal); 
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929) (chaplain); cf. NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (parochial school teacher).  
19 See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 
(1969). 
20 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. 
21 Brief for the Federal Respondent at 11, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553). 
22 See id. at 24–26 (distinguishing, in rapid succession, Milivojevich, Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, and 
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952)); id. at 25 n.5 (distinguishing Watson v. Jones, 
8 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872)); id. at 26 n.6 (distinguishing Gonzalez); id. at 40 n.10 (distinguishing 
Catholic Bishop). 
23 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704 (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116). 
24 Id. at 706. 
25 This is Part II.C of the opinion. See id. at 705–07. 
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The unanimity of the Court is also striking because the Justices are 
often deeply divided on church-and-state matters.26 The Court has been 
unanimous only on basic propositions and extreme facts.27 Lower courts 
universally accepted the ministerial exception, but it faced hostile reviews 
in the legal academy, a chilly reception from liberal public interest groups, 
and an open repudiation from the Solicitor General.28 Had this case been 
decided 5–4, it would have been seen as a partisan victory, as conservative 
religious belief triumphing over liberal civil rights laws. But that narrative 
does not fit the facts. Justice Ginsburg has spent a good part of her life 
working to end discrimination; she joins the majority opinion with no 
expressed reservation. 
Yet sometimes the price of unanimity is clarity, and perhaps Hosanna-
Tabor illustrates that too. The Court is certain that there is a ministerial 
exception, but it is far less certain on the line between ministers and non-
ministers—even though the latter, and not the former, was the issue that 
had divided lower courts.29 On that latter issue, the Court’s opinion lays out 
four criteria: “[T]he formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance 
reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious 
functions she performed for the Church.”30 This is a classic balancing test, 
focused partially on clerical office (the first three criteria) and partially on 
job duties (the fourth). But the Court says little about each of these criteria, 
and nothing about how to weigh them against each other.31 Most of the 
guidance comes from the Court’s holding itself: wherever the boundary is, 
Perich is inside it.32 But the Court rejects a purely functional inquiry, 
emphasizing the importance of Perich’s clerical office.33 And the Court 
adds that the functional part of the inquiry cannot simply be a measure of 
 
26 The Court’s recent decision on the constitutionality of the cross in the Mojave National Preserve 
produced six opinions and little agreement. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010). 
27 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520 (1993). 
28 See Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 n.6 
(2011) (discussing criticisms of the ministerial exception and providing citations); see also supra notes 
21–22 and accompanying text (discussing the Solicitor General’s repudiation). 
29 See Lund, supra note 28, at 3 n.3 (discussing the circuit split). 
30 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708. 
31 The Court does not say whether clerical office would be enough without the religious job duties, 
and expressly declines to say whether the religious job duties would be enough without the clerical 
office. Id. (“We express no view on whether someone with Perich’s duties would be covered by the 
ministerial exception in the absence of the other considerations we have discussed.”). 
32 Id. at 707 (“We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee 
qualifies as a minister. It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial 
exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.”). 
33 Id. at 709. 
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time spent—once one has the requisite degree of religious duties, one is a 
minister regardless of how many secular job duties one might also have.34 
Where this line ultimately gets drawn is obviously of great 
importance. Before Hosanna-Tabor, one criticism of the ministerial 
exception was that it was absolute, that it involved no balancing.35 But it 
would be more accurate to say that the balancing happens categorically 
rather than case-by-case. Different balances between the governmental 
interest and the religious interest get struck by drawing the line between 
ministers and non-ministers in different places. This is another way in 
which Hosanna-Tabor aligns better with Sherbert and Yoder36 than with 
Smith: it smacks of the old compelling interest test when the Court says that 
the employment laws are “undoubtedly important” but still insufficient to 
outweigh the religious interest.37 
Maybe the Court deserves criticism for failing to provide any clear line 
here, but the deeper problem is that there is simply no natural point of 
differentiation between ministers and non-ministers. In the forty years 
before Hosanna-Tabor, lower courts and commentators could not find it.38 
Perhaps this will commit the Court to taking a long string of ministerial 
exception cases. But the opposite result seems more likely. Without a way 
to make things better, the Justices will not want to get involved in this 
again.39 
On some issues, Hosanna-Tabor does give straightforward answers. 
For one thing, the Court had never decided whether church autonomy was a 
Free Exercise or Establishment Clause doctrine.40 Hosanna-Tabor says that 
 
34 Id.  
35 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The “Absolute” Ministerial Exception, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 13, 2012, 
8:59 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/01/absolute-ministerial-exception.html (“One of the curious 
features of the Supreme Court’s version of the ministerial exception is that the rule is stated in absolute 
terms that eschew all attempts at balancing.”). 
36 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing Sherbert and Yoder and the compelling 
interest test they had established for free exercise). 
37 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (“The interest of society in the enforcement of employment 
discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in 
choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.”). 
38 Lower court and commentators often punted in precisely the same way as the Supreme Court did 
in Hosanna-Tabor. See Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292 
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“We leave for another day the formulation of a general test because, under 
any reasonable construction of the ministerial exception, Rosas meets the definition of a minister.”). I 
offered my own thoughts on this issue in a piece published just before Hosanna-Tabor. See Lund, supra 
note 28. 
39 See, e.g., Packwood v. Senate Select Committee on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319, 1320–21 (1994) 
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that certiorari is typically denied 
in cases where a legal standard “cannot be reduced to formula,” because lower court decisions will tend 
to involve “factbound determination[s]”). 
40 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (Free Exercise Clause); Jones v. Wolf, 443 
U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (the First Amendment); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 638 & n.15 (1978) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (Establishment Clause); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 
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it is both.41 For a claim within the ministerial exception’s proper scope, a 
church wins by invoking either the Free Exercise Clause or the 
Establishment Clause. What ripple effects Hosanna-Tabor might cause in 
the general jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause is profoundly 
unclear. Yet the Establishment Clause holding does perhaps suggest an 
important shift on the part of one particular Justice. For years, Justice 
Thomas has battled against the modern Establishment Clause, arguing that 
it applies only to the federal government and not the states.42 But Hosanna-
Tabor dismisses both federal and state law claims, and dismissing state law 
claims on Establishment Clause grounds necessarily implies incorporation 
of the Establishment Clause.43 It is not entirely clear that Justice Thomas 
means to give up this fight, but hopefully Hosanna-Tabor will make it 
harder for him to return to it.44 
Hosanna-Tabor also clarifies that the ministerial exception is an 
affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar.45 Some attach great 
importance to this issue, seeing it as raising a question specifically about 
the meaning of the Religion Clauses.46 But the Court has for years been 
trying to rein in wildly expansive notions about what goes to subject matter 
jurisdiction across doctrinal areas, and Hosanna-Tabor seems to be just 
another example.47 Of course, one likely consequence of the Court’s non-
jurisdictional approach is that ultimately unsuccessful claims will continue 
 
U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (the First Amendment); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449–50 (1969) (the First Amendment); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas 
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (Free Exercise Clause, 
but also the separation of church and state). 
41 132 S. Ct. at 702 (“Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision 
of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”); see also id. at 706 (reiterating the point). 
42 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726–31 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49–50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 
639, 677–80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
43 See 132 S. Ct. at 701 (noting that the suit claimed “unlawful retaliation under both the ADA and 
the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act”). 
44 See id. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring) (endorsing a robust view of the ministerial exception). 
For a persuasive attack on Justice Thomas’s view on incorporation, see Douglas Laycock, Theology 
Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the 
Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 241–43 (2004). 
45 See 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4. 
46 Compare Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the 
Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 43 (2008) (arguing that the ministerial exception is a defense based on subject matter 
jurisdiction), with Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the 
Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289 (2012) (arguing that the ministerial 
exception is a merits-based defense); see also Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church 
Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1891 (2013). 
47 A string of such cases are given in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers & Trainmen General, 558 U.S. 67, 81–82 (2009). 
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further than they did before. Ministerial status is a fact-intensive question.48 
Before Hosanna-Tabor, cases were disposed of on motions to dismiss.49 
Now summary judgment will probably be the norm.50 
Plaintiffs must have the right to prove their cases, of course, but this 
still poses a problem. Churches have a constitutional right to choose their 
ministers without governmental interference.51 Litigation is government 
interference. Financially speaking, litigation that costs as much as a 
damage judgment is just as harmful as a damage judgment. The ministerial 
exception should be thought of not just as a defense to liability, but as a 
right not to face litigation over the choice of one’s clergy. This would 
suggest allowing churches to immediately appeal a conclusion that the 
plaintiff is not a minister52—akin to the interlocutory appeals allowed in the 
contexts of officer immunity, double jeopardy, and state sovereign 
immunity.53 This approach has benefits, but it also has costs: it would 
enable church defendants to prolong legitimate litigation, no matter how 
obvious it is that the plaintiff is not a minister. Maybe a better approach 
would be bifurcated discovery, with the court deciding the applicability of 
the ministerial exception in advance of allowing discovery on other 
issues.54 This makes a great deal of sense: issues of ministerial status 
naturally separate from questions of discrimination and retaliation, and the 
facts surrounding ministerial status are less frequently disputed, more 
quickly and easily ascertained, and more objectively proven. 
 
48 One case, decided after Hosanna-Tabor, involved facts virtually identical to those of Hosanna-
Tabor: both parish-owned schools, both within the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, both elementary 
school teachers, both commissioned ministers, both called positions. Of course, the case had to be 
litigated to judgment. See Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
49 See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting how “assertion of the 
ministerial exception . . . is akin to a government official’s defense of qualified immunity, which is 
often raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion”). 
50 See Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 172 n.3 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Given the 
nature of the ministerial exception, we suspect that only in the rarest of circumstances would dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6)—in other words, based solely on the pleadings—be warranted.”). 
51 “Governmental interference” is another phrase that runs throughout the Court’s opinion. See 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 704 (2012) 
(“[G]overnment interference with a church’s ability to select its own ministers . . . .”); id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“[F]ree from state interference [with regard to] matters of church government 
as well as those of faith and doctrine . . . .”); id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[F]reedom to 
select the clergy . . . is part of the free exercise of religion protected by the First Amendment against 
government interference . . . .”); id. at 707 (“The present case . . . concerns government interference 
with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself . . . .”). 
52 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 870 (1994) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (noting that interlocutory appeals are necessary when the right includes an “entitlement 
not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,” because the right “would be effectively lost if a 
case [were] erroneously permitted to go to trial” (alteration in original)). 
53 See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305–07 (1996) (discussing these three examples). 
54 For a general discussion of bifurcated discovery, see John P. Rowley III & Richard G. Moore, 
Bifurcation of Civil Trials, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2010). 
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All this minutiae is of consequence, but it is minutiae nonetheless. The 
defining aspect of Hosanna-Tabor is in how it treats religion as distinctive. 
In Smith, and in the earlier regulatory burden cases, the Court framed the 
issue as whether religious believers should get an “exemption” from a 
generally applicable law. Exemptions evoke the idea of special treatment, 
which many equate with favoritism. The word “exemption” appears thirty-
five times in the Smith opinions. But it does not appear anywhere in 
Hosanna-Tabor, in any of the opinions. (If it were not called the ministerial 
exception, the word “exception” would not appear either.) The Court does 
not ask whether churches should be exempt from employment 
discrimination laws. Instead, the Court asks whether churches have the 
right to choose their leaders. This is more than a clever rhetorical 
flourish—it is a change in baseline. It does not matter how anyone else is 
treated; religious groups have the right to choose their leaders. Churches do 
not get reformed by the government, no matter what else the government 
tries to reform. The Court begins by grounding this right in historical 
tradition and case precedent, but it quickly retreats back to the 
constitutional text: “[T]he text of the First Amendment itself . . . gives 
special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.”55 
This sentence grows more awkward every time one reads it. The First 
Amendment speaks of religion, not religious organizations. Religion is 
what gets special solicitude. Religious organizations may also get special 
solicitude, but that would come only as a derivative consequence. 
The Court, of course, knows all this perfectly well. But it will not say 
it, probably because it believes doing so would undermine Smith. Here the 
Court should take its own awkwardness seriously: when a precedent 
demands transparently false statements about constitutional text, it is time 
to rethink the precedent. In any event, the Court recognizes the need to 
distinguish Smith. Here is how the Court does so: 
It is true that the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation, like Oregon’s prohibition 
on peyote use, is a valid and neutral law of general applicability. But a 
church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote. 
Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. The 
present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal 
church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.56 
This distinction has already come under fire from critics of Hosanna-
Tabor.57 Even fiercer attacks will eventually come from the other side, and 
 
55 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. 
56 Id. at 707. 
57 See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Essay, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951, 955 (2012) (“[T]his distinction . . . is far from 
self-evident.”); Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 993 (2013) (“That 
distinction cannot hold water.”); Mark Strasser, Making the Anomalous Even More Anomalous: On 
Hosanna-Tabor, the Ministerial Exception, and the Constitution, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 400, 444 
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for an obvious reason. Smith scrapped the compelling interest test for Free 
Exercise by a 5–4 vote; Hosanna-Tabor was 9–0. If one of the two must be 
overruled, it will probably not be Hosanna-Tabor. There is no question 
which is the fixed star. 
But neither of them will be overruled any time soon. The immediate 
question is how to best read them together. Some have said that Hosanna-
Tabor draws a line between individuals and institutions. Hosanna-Tabor 
protects institutions; Smith refused to protect individuals.58 That is a good 
first stab, but more is needed. Individuals have no right to use peyote under 
Smith, but neither does the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church can fire 
ministers for any reason under Hosanna-Tabor, but any individual who 
hires a minister would have exactly the same right.59 Religious institutions 
will benefit from Hosanna-Tabor. But the case is more about the nature of 
religious association than the power of religious institutions. 
Hosanna-Tabor distinguishes between “internal church decision[s]” 
and “outward physical acts.”60 “Internal” is the important word, appearing 
at several crucial points in the opinion.61 But this “internal versus external” 
distinction runs immediately into a difficulty. After establishing the 
ministerial exception, the Court hints that churches selecting ministers 
would probably have no immunity from the child labor laws or the 
immigration laws.62 Such a conclusion seems instinctively right, and it is 
 
(2012) (“[S]uch a distinction is unpersuasive . . . .”). For an even stronger criticism, see Michael C. 
Dorf, Ministers and Peyote, DORF ON LAW (Jan. 12, 2012, 12:30 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/
01/ministers-and-peyote.html (“With due respect: huh???”).  
58 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 57, at 971 (“[T]he Supreme Court chose to tip the scales and protect 
religious institutions instead of religious individuals . . . .”); Griffin, supra note 57, at 1016 (“Individual 
religious believers are subject to the rule of Smith, while institutions are not.”). Even some of Hosanna-
Tabor’s defenders have phrased it this way. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-
Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 835–36 (2012) (“Hosanna-Tabor suggest[s] a shift in Religion 
Clauses jurisprudence from a focus on individual believers to a focus on the autonomy of organized 
religious institutions.”). 
59 Federal employment discrimination laws only apply to entities with a certain number of 
employees, but some state laws have no numerical thresholds in their laws. See Sandra F. Sperino, 
Recreating Diversity in Employment Law by Debunking the Myth of the McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 
44 HOUS. L. REV. 349, 355 n.20 (2007) (providing citations to state laws). 
60 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
61 E.g., id. at 705 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[I]nternal discipline and government . . . .”); 
id. at 706 (“[I]nternal governance of the church . . . .”); id. at 707 (“[I]nternal church decision . . . .”); id. 
at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[M]atters of internal governance . . . .”). Before Hosanna-Tabor, 
lower courts sometimes referred to the ministerial exception as part of a larger “internal affairs” 
doctrine. See, e.g., Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.) 
(arguing that the ministerial exception “is better termed the ‘ministers exception’ . . . [or] better still . . . 
the ‘internal affairs’ doctrine”). 
62 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (noting the church’s concession that the ministerial exception 
would not “bar government enforcement of general laws restricting eligibility for employment,” such as 
the laws forbidding the “hiring [of] children or aliens not authorized to work in the United States”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1194 
consistent with what courts were doing before Hosanna-Tabor.63 But this 
would seem to contradict what the Court said immediately before, because 
hiring an illegal alien as one’s minister is an internal church decision, not 
an outward physical act. 
To make sense of this, we must turn to a later line in the opinion where 
the Court remarks how “the [ministerial] exception applies only to suits by 
or on behalf of ministers themselves.”64 This is what seems to drive the 
Court’s “internal versus external” idea. The church autonomy line of cases 
grows out of a notion of implied consent.65 When one joins a church, one 
accepts the religious choices made by the church. People can leave or stay. 
But so long as they choose to stay, they accept how the church handles its 
religious affairs. Dissenters cannot use the coercive force of the 
government to compel a change in the church’s religious views, practices, 
or governance.66 
The consent idea will be examined in more detail in the next Part, but 
the immediate point is that it can reconcile Hosanna-Tabor’s principle with 
its limits. Consent binds those who consent.67 And it binds those who bring 
derivative claims. Consent here being of a constitutional nature, it bars the 
government from acting on behalf of those who consent. But it does not bar 
outsiders to the church, and it does not bar the government from acting on 
behalf of those outsiders. 
This has the power to conceptually resolve the point about illegal 
aliens.68 The government can prosecute a church for hiring an illegal alien 
as a minister because such a suit is on behalf of the public at large rather 
than any distressed church insider. This can also reconcile Smith. The 
government can prosecute the Native American Church for using peyote in 
 
63 In one case, Quakers challenged laws requiring them to verify the immigration status of their 
employees. The Court held that the issue was not governed by the church autonomy cases, but by the 
regulatory exemption cases. See Am. Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 951 F.2d 957, 959 
(9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the church “simply argues that its religious principles compel conduct that 
[the immigration law] makes unlawful” and “[t]hat fact does not bring AFSC within the rule of Catholic 
Bishop”); see also Brock v. Wendell’s Woodwork, Inc., 867 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
a church vocational program placing underage children with associated employers was barred by the 
Fair Labor Standards Act). 
64 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
65 E.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871) (“All who unite themselves to such a 
body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.” (emphasis 
added)). 
66 See Lund, supra note 28, at 13 (summarizing the church autonomy cases this way). 
67 This is a familiar principle in law. But to give an example, two people who agree to fight each 
other cannot sue each other in tort, although the government can criminally prosecute them both. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892C cmt. b, illus. 3 (1979) (“A and B agree to fight a duel with 
pistols. A fires at B and his bullet strikes and breaks B’s arm. A is not liable to B.”). 
68 This does not explain Hosanna-Tabor’s point about children. The argument there would have to 
be that children are somehow incapable of consent, or that the government interest in protecting 
children is sufficiently compelling to outweigh church autonomy. 
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its religious rituals. But a suit by a minister against the Native American 
Church over the church’s peyote use—imagine, say, an emotional distress 
claim brought by a disgruntled former minister, claiming bad spiritual 
consequences from using the drug—probably falls within Hosanna-Tabor’s 
sphere. Of course, this introduces a very slippery distinction. It will be 
difficult to tell when exactly the government acts on behalf of insiders and 
when it acts on behalf of outsiders.69 But this insider–outsider distinction 
provides a good starting point. Suits of the form “government versus 
church” will generally be within Smith’s domain. Suits of the form “insider 
versus church” or “government on behalf of insider versus church” will be 
within Hosanna-Tabor’s. 
All this can make it seem like Hosanna-Tabor prefers churches over 
their ministers.70 But this is wrong, or at least it should be wrong. Suits of 
the form “church versus insider” are just as barred as suits of the form 
“insider versus church.” The ministerial exception is a form of 
constitutionalized at-will employment; it enables both sides to leave the 
relationship at any time, without legal reprisal. In our modern age, 
employers now sue employees for things like breach of fiduciary duty and 
unfair competition. The duty of loyalty allows employers to claw back 
compensation when a jury finds that an employee has committed serious 
misconduct.71 The ministerial exception should bar these claims too. Juries 
do not decide whether ministers have done their jobs well or not. Ministers 
and churches may disagree about who was responsible for the relationship 
breakdown, but the government stays out of those disagreements. 
Talk of constitutionalized at-will employment may remind some 
readers of the Lochner era, when the Court experimented with 
constitutionalized at-will employment with some bad results.72 And indeed, 
minimizing governmental influence in economic affairs now seems silly to 
most people; we tend to write off Lochner and its companion decisions as 
foolish misadventures. But minimizing governmental influence in religious 
 
69 To the extent the Smith Court considered the harms of Native American peyote use, they focused 
on the possibilities of diversion to those outside the Native American Church. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 904–06 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding this to be a compelling interest 
justifying the burden on religion). 
70 Both sides have seen it this way. See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko & Marissa Parker, Still a Threshold 
Question: Refining the Ministerial Exception Post-Hosanna-Tabor, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 233, 244 
(2012) (footnotes omitted) (“In the end, this article advocates for the proposition that a ‘minister’ may 
not sue her ‘church’ in the ‘civil courts’ for claims ‘arising out of the terms and conditions of her 
ministry.’”); Griffin, supra note 57, at 1010 (“The ministerial rule always favors employers.”).  
71 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (1958) (“An agent is entitled to no 
compensation for conduct which is disobedient or which is a breach of his duty of loyalty . . . .”); see 
also Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment Law, Contract 
Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777 (discussing the duty of loyalty).  
72 See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating a federal law protecting railroad 
workers discharged for union activity as an unjustified imposition on the constitutional freedom to 
contract); see also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating a similar state law). 
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affairs is not at all silly—that is the point of the First Amendment. “Laissez 
faire” means “leave it be” in French. That may be poor economic theory 
with no constitutional basis, as the Court eventually came to believe.73 But 
leaving people be is precisely the right approach for government to take 
with regard to religion. The government does not practice religion; it does 
not interfere with the private practice of religion; it leaves religion be. A 
complex modern society like ours must impose limits on that principle out 
of necessity, but that is the principle. Hosanna-Tabor could be thought of 
as part of the state’s general laissez-faire attitude to the clergy. The state 
does not hire or fire clergy; it does not get involved when churches hire or 
fire them. The state does not pay clergy; it does not decide how much 
churches should pay them.74 The state does not license clergy; it does not 
decree what qualifications churches can require.75 All this the state leaves 
alone. 
More will be said about the justifications for church autonomy and the 
scope of the church autonomy principle. The point of this Article is to work 
those things out. Certainly Hosanna-Tabor does not try to do so. The Court 
says explicitly that it only means to consider the employment 
discrimination laws.76 Of course, any plausible reading of Hosanna-Tabor 
includes more than that. No court would allow Cheryl Perich to repackage 
her allegations into claims of negligence, defamation, or emotional 
distress.77 This is an inference, of course, but it seems a necessary one. 
Hosanna-Tabor will not make any sense otherwise. 
II. HOSANNA-TABOR, CHURCH AUTONOMY,  
AND RELIGIOUS VOLUNTARISM 
Hosanna-Tabor establishes a certain principle with an uncertain scope: 
“[R]eligious organizations [have] power to decide for themselves, free 
 
73 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”). 
74 See, e.g., Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.) 
(dismissing minimum-wage and overtime claims brought by ministers of the Salvation Army). 
75 See, e.g., HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Tex. Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., 235 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. 
2007) (holding unconstitutional a statutory regime where seminaries had to obtain certificates of 
authority or accreditation from the state). 
76 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012) 
(“We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by 
employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers. There will be 
time enough to address the applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they 
arise.”). 
77 Such claims were dismissed even before Hosanna-Tabor. See, e.g., Guerrier v. S. New Eng. 
Conference Ass’n of Seventh-Day Adventists, Inc., No. CV085007824, 2009 WL 4282894 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2009) (dismissing not only discrimination claims, but also a variety of tort claims, 
including claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
and false light). 
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from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of 
faith and doctrine.”78 This is a right of self-determination. Churches handle 
their own affairs.79 Church decisions are made by church authorities, not by 
legislatures, administrative agencies, judges, or juries.80 The government 
does not subsidize the religious functions of churches; it does not regulate 
those functions either. It does not dictate standards for religious behavior; it 
does not monitor compliance with those standards; and it does not issue 
licenses when they are satisfied or sanctions when they are not. Because the 
government does not itself make religious decisions, it has nothing to say 
about the religious decisions made by churches. If the government had a 
basis for interfering in religious controversies within churches, it would 
have a basis for interfering in religious controversies outside of churches. 
These principles come out of the Supreme Court’s church autonomy 
cases, probably the most complicated area of the Religion Clauses. But to 
understand group freedom of religion, it helps to begin with individual 
freedom of religion. There is widespread agreement that religious faith and 
practice should be voluntary. This works smoothly enough with 
individuals. Each person decides for himself or herself what to believe. 
Within limits understandably imposed by the communal nature of society, 
each person decides for himself or herself how to practice his or her faith as 
well. No one gets to control another person’s religious conduct; no one has 
the right to force his religion on someone else. The last two points have 
become the core of the modern Establishment Clause: you have the right 
not to sit through someone else’s church service, whether it is a long 
service on Sunday81 or a short prayer at a high school graduation or football 
game.82 The law often gives people control over other peoples’ choices.83 
 
78 132 S. Ct. at 704 (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church 
in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)); see also id. at 711–12 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The First 
Amendment protects the freedom of religious groups to engage in certain key religious activities, 
including the conducting of worship services and other religious ceremonies and rituals, as well as the 
critical process of communicating the faith.”). 
79 See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church 
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1981) (footnotes 
omitted) (arguing that churches have the right “to select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, 
resolve their own disputes, and run their own institutions”). 
80 See Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 254 (2009) 
(“The essence of church autonomy is that the Catholic Church should be run by duly constituted 
Catholic authorities and not by legislators, administrative agencies, labor unions, disgruntled lay people, 
or other actors lacking authority under church law.”). 
81 Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: 
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2144 (2003) (“In England, from the time of 
Elizabeth I, those who ‘absented themselves from the divine worship in the established church’ were 
subject to a fine of one shilling for a single absence and twenty pounds for a month’s absence.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *52)). 
82 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (football game); Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577 (1992) (graduation). 
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But the law does not give people control over other peoples’ religious 
choices. 
With groups, the principle is the same, but the implementation grows 
more complicated. Each person’s right of religious exercise has to be 
exercised in light of everyone else’s. This creates tensions, and the Court’s 
church autonomy cases represent its attempts to cabin those tensions as 
much as possible. The position they end up taking is that disgruntled 
members of a church cannot sue to try and change the religious beliefs, 
doctrines, and governance of their churches. For were that to happen, they 
would effectively control everyone else’s religious choices. 
One of the most important Supreme Court cases, Presbyterian Church 
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull,84 bears out these points most clearly. As in a 
number of the church autonomy cases, the issue was what to do with the 
property when a church split into two factions. The Georgia courts had 
applied the old English rule, where courts would decide which of the two 
factions came closest to the original beliefs of the church.85 The Supreme 
Court in Mary Elizabeth unanimously held this unconstitutional. Its opinion 
talks at length about how the rule requires courts to answer inappropriate 
religious questions.86 And when professors teach Mary Elizabeth, this is 
where they tend to focus.87 But there is another key point to the case. The 
English rule had grown into a system where churches could not change 
their religious doctrines without the risk of later losing their property. Even 
a single dissenter that wanted things the old way could claim a departure 
from doctrine and sue for control of the property.88 The departure-from-
doctrine rule thus ended up reinforcing the status quo, a usually 
conservative status quo. In Watson v. Jones, dissenters used it to try and 
 
83 This is one way of seeing, for example, negligence law. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding that the owner of a vessel that broke free of its moorings 
negligently, and thus unlawfully, caused the sinking of another person’s ship). 
84 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
85 Id. at 443–44. 
86 See id. at 449 (“First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation 
is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”). 
87 See, e.g., EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS, 
CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 899 (5th ed. 2014) (explaining Mary Elizabeth as part of a “no 
religious decisions principle,” whereby “[g]overnment officials . . . may not interpret religious doctrine” 
(emphasis omitted)); Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 
2010 UTAH L. REV. 47, 57 (arguing that Mary Elizabeth establishes a principle that “courts must avoid 
intervening in religious disputes when doing so would entail their deciding theological or ecclesiastical 
questions”); Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1831, 1836 (2009) (explaining Mary Elizabeth as being about “the state’s incompetence 
to decide matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice or belief”).  
88 See Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REV. 
1142, 1148 (1962) (“Read literally, the Lord Chancellor’s opinion [in the English departure-from-
doctrine case, Attorney General ex rel. Mander v. Pearson, (1817) 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch.)] seems to 
brook no doctrinal evolution within a congregation except on pain of forfeiture of its property.”). 
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seize property when the Presbyterian Church renounced slavery.89 In Mary 
Elizabeth, dissenters used it when the church decided to ordain women.90 If 
the rule existed today, it would be invoked by those upset by national 
churches deciding to ordain gays and lesbians.91 
The lesson of Mary Elizabeth is that dissenters do not get to control 
their churches through litigation. And in many modern cases, that is 
precisely what is being sought, at least beneath the surface. A woman’s 
husband becomes abusive.92 But she is a Jehovah’s Witness, and Jehovah’s 
Witnesses teach that marriage is permanent and that divorce is immoral.93 
When she finally leaves her husband, she sues the church, claiming that she 
would have left him a long time ago had it not been for the church’s 
counseling. She thinks that the church caused those extra years of abuse, 
and she may be right about that. But whether she is right about that or not, 
her claim cannot go forward if the church has the right to teach what it 
believes about marriage. 
Mary Elizabeth is one of many cases where the Supreme Court has 
dealt with two factions disputing over property. But, in an important sense, 
a church’s religious beliefs, practices, and doctrines are just as rivalrous 
and excludable as a church’s real property. Only one faction ultimately gets 
the property; only one faction ultimately controls the church’s religious 
beliefs and practices. In Mary Elizabeth and the other church property 
cases, the Supreme Court has been clear: the duly constituted church 
authorities get to decide. In the cases that this Article will soon address, the 
same principle pushes toward the same conclusion. 
In a sense, this also returns us to Hosanna-Tabor. In every ministerial 
exception case, a minister has lost his church and cannot get it back 
voluntarily. What the minister claims is a right to force the church back 
involuntarily. His argument is essentially this: I have a right to practice 
religion with them, no matter what they want.94 The ministerial exception 
cuts this off at the knees. No one has the right to be a minister over a 
congregation against its will. In a system where religion is voluntary, no 
 
89 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
90 393 U.S. at 442 & n.1. 
91 See, e.g., Rector v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese of Ga., Inc., 718 S.E.2d 237 (Ga. 2011). 
92 E.g., DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 829 A.2d 38 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2003). But there is a long history of these cases. See, e.g., Radecki v. Schuckardt, 361 N.E.2d 543 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1976); Bradesku v. Antion, 255 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969); Carrieri v. Bush, 419 P.2d 
132 (Wash. 1966). 
93 See 1 INSIGHT ON THE SCRIPTURES 639–40 (Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of 
Pennsylvania 1988). 
94 Sometimes plaintiffs’ attorneys have been a little too explicit about this. See Ferreira v. Harris, 
No. 06-CV-0163-CVE-SAJ, 2006 WL 1720546, at *5 (N.D. Okla. June 20, 2006) (“Plaintiff claims he 
has been denied his right to freely associate with a church of his choice by the actions of Woodland 
View.”). 
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one can have the right to practice religion with people who do not want to 
practice religion with them.95 
Those who talk about church autonomy sometimes refer to the idea of 
implied consent because it features prominently in Watson v. Jones, the 
first church autonomy case: “All who unite themselves to such a body do 
so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to 
it.”96 Implied consent gets a number of things right, but it can be 
misleading. Take Hosanna-Tabor, for example. Ministers certainly do not 
consent to discrimination. But they consent to being a minister in their 
churches, and it is that consent which precludes them from challenging 
how the church selects its ministers. Now maybe implied consent is not the 
best phrase for this; this is probably more analogous to assumption of risk. 
But of course it is true that implied consent is not consent, nor even a proxy 
for consent. Implied consent is a fiction used to operationalize the 
constitutional right of churches to have control over their own decisions. 
With this conceptual background now in place, this Article divides the 
field of legal obligations into two areas—imposed legal obligations and 
assumed legal obligations. Imposed (or involuntary) legal obligations 
include those of tort and criminal law, as well as those of labor law and 
employment discrimination. The duties created by these laws are in no 
sense assumed by the parties—they are imposed by the law. Law here does 
not try to approximate human intentions; it is meant to override human 
intentions. By contrast, assumed (or voluntary) legal obligations include 
those of contract, property, and corporate law. The parties assume the 
duties created here: they choose to enter into contracts, trusts, and corporate 
arrangements. 
Now, to be sure, this distinction is not airtight. One could argue, for 
example, that employment law obligations are assumed. Churches would 
be free of employment law if they choose not to hire people; churches that 
hire less than fifteen people are still mostly free of federal employment 
laws.97 Because there is no general duty to rescue, one could say that all of 
tort law is assumed; tort law only kicks in when one voluntarily chooses to 
get involved with other people.98 But we can only speak of private ordering 
because we believe that this distinction reflects something real, no matter 
how messy it ends up being in practice. 
 
95 See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 n.5 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (“No member of a church may claim, under the First Amendment, an enforceable right to be 
considered or accepted by the church hierarchy as a minister.”). 
96 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871). 
97 See Lund, supra note 28, at 8–10 (discussing these points). 
98 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (“The fact that the actor realizes or should 
realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon 
him a duty to take such action.”). 
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Another reason to credit this distinction is that the Supreme Court has 
now tacitly adopted it. This is clear when one contrasts Hosanna-Tabor 
with the Court’s earlier decision in Jones v. Wolf.99 One constitutional way 
of resolving a property dispute between church factions, the Court said in 
Jones, was through “neutral principles of law.”100 Because churches could 
freely structure their property arrangements as they wanted, courts could 
use general principles of property law to discern where the church would 
have wanted the property to go in the event of a split.101 Those who argued 
against the ministerial exception relied heavily on Jones, saying that the 
employment discrimination laws were also neutral principles of law.102 But 
the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor ignored that argument; none of the 
Hosanna-Tabor opinions even cite the case. The Court clearly thought 
Jones irrelevant. 
The reason for this seems obvious in retrospect: Jones and Hosanna-
Tabor belong to fundamentally different categories. Jones is a property 
case, a case about assumed legal obligations, where applying the regular 
rules of law heightens church autonomy by enabling churches to structure 
their affairs as they want. Hosanna-Tabor is an employment case, a case 
about imposed legal obligations, where applying the regular rules of law 
undercuts church autonomy. These two situations require different 
approaches, as the Supreme Court implicitly recognized in Hosanna-Tabor. 
III. CHURCH AUTONOMY AND IMPOSED LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
When people think about constitutional freedoms, they typically 
imagine suits between a private entity and the government. But 
increasingly, the Supreme Court has had to address the effect of 
constitutional rights on civil suits between private parties. Most cases have 
involved the Free Speech Clause.103 But speech is not special, or at least not 
uniquely special. Every constitutional right requires some immunity from 
generally applicable laws. A woman’s constitutional right to an abortion 
would make little sense if the would-be father could sue the aborting 
 
99 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
100 Id. at 604. 
101 Id. at 603 (“[T]he neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems 
in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties. 
Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious societies can specify what is to 
happen to church property . . . .”). 
102 See Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 21, at 12, 26–28; see also Corbin, supra note 
57, at 957–58 (making this argument about Jones v. Wolf). 
103 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (dismissing intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy claims as barred by the First Amendment); NAACP 
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (dismissing interference with business relations 
claims); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (dismissing defamation claims). 
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woman for intentional infliction of emotional distress.104 It would function 
exactly like a requirement of spousal consent, held unconstitutional long 
ago.105 Roe v. Wade would break down if any woman who ended up 
regretting her abortion could turn around and sue the clinic in a wrongful 
death action.106 
Tort liability can also erode constitutional freedoms more subtly. Take 
Doe v. Moe,107 which involved a couple in a long-term, sexually active 
relationship. One morning, they were having sex in one of their usual 
positions. But she changed positions quickly and without warning, slipped 
off of her partner, and fractured his penis.108 So he sued her. The 
Massachusetts Court of Appeals dismissed his case, saying that she owed 
no legal duty to him. But taking this at face value misses the point, because 
there is always a legal duty to avoid physically injuring someone else.109 
The court here crafted a special “no duty” rule for self-consciously 
constitutional reasons. The court’s opinion cites all the usual suspects: 
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Casey, and Lawrence.110 And this makes sense. We 
talk about a constitutional right to sexual liberty; Lawrence talks about how 
“adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home [involves] vital interests in 
liberty and privacy.”111 But if the principle is that people should get to do 
what they want behind closed doors without government interference, adult 
 
104 In hearing such a case, Judge Posner put it well: “[W]e do not see how, as a matter of either 
legal logic or common sense, the constitutional right of a woman to have an abortion without 
interference from the man who impregnated her can coexist with a . . . right of the man to interfere.” 
Coe v. Cnty. of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1998). Apparently the earliest case presenting this 
fact pattern was Przybyla v. Przybyla, 275 N.W.2d 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978), which dismissed an ex-
husband’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against his former wife for having an 
abortion. See id. at 115 (“We hold that the intentional exercise by a woman and her physician of her 
right to terminate her pregnancy as protected by the United States Constitution, cannot constitute 
conduct that is so extreme and outrageous that it meets the [requirement for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress].”). 
105 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding spousal consent 
unconstitutional); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding 
spousal notification unconstitutional). 
106 See, e.g., Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (dismissing 
various claims against an abortion clinic, including wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, and alleged violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Act); Acuna v. 
Turkish, 930 A.2d 416 (N.J. 2007) (dismissing wrongful death, survival, and emotional distress claims). 
107 827 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).  
108 “[T]he defendant landed awkwardly on the plaintiff, thereby causing him to suffer a penile 
fracture.” Id. at 243. The plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured. The court noted that he 
needed “emergency surgery,” then “endured a painful and lengthy recovery,” and still suffers “from 
sexual dysfunction that neither medication nor counseling have been able to treat effectively.” Id. 
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7(a) (2010) (“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”). 
110 See Doe v. Moe, 827 N.E.2d at 245 & n.5 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965)). 
111 539 U.S. at 564. 
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men and women cannot sue each other for injuries arising out of sexual acts 
to which they both freely consented. Juries do not decide which sexual 
practices have benefits worth the risks. The diversity of sexual practices 
requires that such decisions be made privately and not collectively. 
The same is true for religion. (Replace “sexual” with “religious” in the 
last two sentences—nothing should change.) Hosanna-Tabor begins 
implementation of this principle by differentiating internal church matters. 
With one eye on Hosanna-Tabor, and the other on the lower court cases we 
will soon discuss, this Article suggests an overarching principle: absent 
some compelling governmental interest, the First Amendment precludes 
insiders from suing their churches over matters of significant religious 
concern. 
This first requires a discussion of insiders and outsiders. Insiders are 
bound by the principles of church autonomy, but outsiders are not.112 
Indeed, outsiders have constitutional rights against church autonomy; they 
have constitutional rights to be free from the power of other peoples’ 
churches. This is one way of seeing the nondelegation cases; the leading 
Supreme Court case here invalidated a statute giving churches power to 
deny liquor licenses.113 
An important aspect of church autonomy is how every insider has the 
right to leave, the right to become an outsider. Maybe this is part of the 
church autonomy principle itself; maybe it describes the limits of church 
autonomy. But either way, church autonomy implies a constitutional right 
of exit from religious organizations. In discussing Hosanna-Tabor earlier, 
we said that the ministerial exception entitles both sides—both ministers 
and churches—to end the relationship at any time without legal liability. 
This constitutional protection accorded to ministers is one aspect of their 
constitutional right to exit.114 
Though the distinction between insiders and outsiders makes intuitive 
sense, the line between them is blurry. Hosanna-Tabor treats ministers as 
insiders, barring their discrimination claims. Lower courts treat church 
members as insiders, barring suits challenging defamation, 
excommunication, or shunning.115 But there are gray areas. A number of 
recent suits involve children at Catholic schools challenging their 
expulsions in court. Catholic schools are part of the Catholic Church. And 
although they educate many non-Catholic students, those students chose a 
 
112 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012) 
(“[T]he [ministerial] exception applies only to suits by or on behalf of ministers themselves.”). 
113 See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating a statute that gave power 
to churches and schools to prevent issuance of liquor licenses to establishments within 500 feet of 
them); see also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
114 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (discussing this point). 
115 See infra notes 177–78 and accompanying text (providing examples). 
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Catholic school. But this is a boundary question, and courts have split on 
the answer.116 
This principle also requires a discussion of religiosity. The Free 
Exercise Clause is implicated only when the government interferes with 
religious beliefs or conduct.117 This is also true for church autonomy.118 
This is why the regular tort rules apply to someone hit by the church bus119 
or by a falling gargoyle.120 Those suits threaten no religious practice. But 
once some religious practice is at stake, the First Amendment comes into 
play. It should not matter whether the practice is considered obligatory or 
not.121 The Supreme Court has always been clear that religious actions are 
protected, whether considered compulsory or not.122 Hosanna-Tabor 
reaffirms that position.123 Yet lower courts sometimes get this wrong, with 
unfortunate effects. In one recent case, for example, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court held that a Buddhist group could be denied a permit for 
constructing a religious temple, despite a federal law requiring the 
government to offer a compelling governmental interest for any substantial 
burden imposed on religious exercise. The Connecticut Supreme Court 
 
116 See Connor v. Archdiocese of Phila., 975 A.2d 1084, 1090–92 (Pa. 2009) (providing citations 
regarding the split in authority). 
117 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“[T]o have the protection of the Religion 
Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.”). 
118 See, e.g., Kubala v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 41 A.3d 351, 357 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 2011) (“When a defendant raises the free exercise clause of the [F]irst [A]mendment as a defense, 
the threshold question is whether the conduct of the defendants is religious.”), aff’d, 38 A.3d 1252 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2012); Checkley v. Boyd, 14 P.3d 81, 87 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he success of a free 
exercise defense to a tort claim depends as a threshold matter on whether the conduct or statements on 
which liability is predicated were in fact religious in nature.”). 
119 This hypothetical once actually arose. See, e.g., Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 66 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 1, 9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“Thus, driving a Sunday-School bus does not constitute a religious 
practice merely because the bus is owned by a religion, the driver is an ordained minister of the 
religion, and the bus is taking church members to a religious ceremony.” (citing Malloy v. Fong, 232 
P.2d 241 (Cal. 1951) (involving a thirteen-year-old boy who sued a church’s seminarian for a car 
accident on their way to vacation Bible school))). 
120 See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The minister struck on the head 
by a falling gargoyle as he is about to enter the church may have an actionable claim.”). 
121 See Laycock, supra note 79, at 1390 (“One of the most common errors in free exercise analysis 
is to try to fit all free exercise claims into the conscientious objector category and reject the ones that do 
not fit.”). 
122 In Smith, for example, the Supreme Court did not ask whether the use of peyote was religiously 
required of the Native American Church plaintiffs. What was relevant was that the use of peyote was 
part of a religious practice. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (describing the exercise 
of religion as involving “acts or abstentions . . . [that] are engaged in for religious reasons”); id. at 893 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[C]onduct motivated by sincere religious belief . . . .”); see also Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (asking whether a practice was “rooted in religious belief”); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (“[F]ollowing the precepts of [one’s] religion . . . .”). 
123 By holding the ministerial exception to be a categorical bar, Hosanna-Tabor made clear that it 
did not matter whether the church’s decision was necessitated by religious doctrine. See Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012). 
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concluded that the denial did not burden the group’s religious exercise, 
apparently because the Buddhists had no religious objection to worshipping 
outside.124 
Courts also must take care not to conceive of the religious interest at 
stake too narrowly. Lawyers are not stupid; they will not openly challenge 
religious practices. Take the case about the plaintiff who alleged that 
church teaching caused her to stay with her abusive husband too long.125 
Rather than say that the church was wrong to teach that divorce was 
immoral, plaintiffs will say that the church should have referred her to a 
more professional counselor, or should have pressured the husband into 
therapy, or done some other such thing. Plaintiffs will plead their case 
around the religious issues. 
Defamation claims provide another example. Unless Hosanna-Tabor 
puts some limits on defamation claims, plaintiffs need only rephrase their 
pleadings to avoid the ministerial exception.126 Unable to argue that they 
were fired for wrong reasons, ministers will simply claim that the 
congregation stated wrong reasons in coming to its decision. This would be 
an end-run around the ministerial exception, but courts have sometimes 
bought into its logic.127 Self-governance—and Hosanna-Tabor’s principle, 
again, of one of self-governance—requires freedom of speech, which 
demands free and open lines of communication.128 Churches have the right 
not only to dismiss ministers and expel congregants, but to freely talk about 
why ministers should be dismissed and congregants expelled. It would 
make no sense otherwise. It would encourage the worst kind of church 
decisionmaking otherwise. But only if courts adopt a bird’s-eye view will 
they be able to recognize the religious interests at play here. 
 
124 See Cambodian Buddhist Soc’y of Conn., Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 941 A.2d 868, 
888 (Conn. 2008) (explaining that “building and owning a church is a desirable accessory of worship, 
not a fundamental tenet of the [c]ongregation’s religious beliefs” (quoting Lakewood, Ohio 
Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 1983))) 
(alteration in original). 
125 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract 
Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 829 A.2d 38 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)). 
126 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between 
Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 155 (2009) (arguing that to 
allow defamation claims in this context would be to allow “a collateral attack on a decision that is 
otherwise solidly protected by the ministerial exception”). 
127 See Tubra v. Cooke, 225 P.3d 862, 872 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).  
128 For a recent, interesting, and important extension of this principle, see Purdum v. Purdum, 301 
P.3d 718 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013). In Purdum, a man brought a defamation suit against his former wife for 
things she said about him during a religious annulment proceeding in the Catholic Church. The Court 
dismissed the case as barred by the First Amendment. Id. at 727 (noting that “[t]here is no doubt that the 
First Amendment offers no protection to religious worshipers who make slanderous or libelous 
statements outside ecclesiastical tribunals, but that is not the case here” because the wife “asked for an 
annulment in a church forum as part of a church-approved, church-defined, and church-controlled 
process where the church would determine the validity of the church’s marriage sacrament”). 
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In addition to insider status and religiosity, the familiar idea of rules 
and standards also comes into play here.129 Courts are (and should be) 
particularly suspicious about imposing liability on religious behavior 
through amorphous standards.130 The lack of notice, combined with 
discretion as regards liability, creates tremendous potential for mischief. 
Yet there is also a deep suspicion of standards particular to the Free 
Exercise Clause. Before Smith, the Court had used a compelling interest 
test in Free Exercise cases, a test associated chiefly with two cases: 
Sherbert and Yoder. Sherbert involved a standard—South Carolina only 
gave unemployment compensation to people who had “good cause” for 
refusing to work.131 Yoder involved a rule—Wisconsin children under the 
age of sixteen had to attend public school.132 Smith overruled the 
compelling interest test, but it overruled neither Sherbert nor Yoder. The 
Court’s preservation of Yoder has always perplexed commentators.133 But 
its preservation of Sherbert—which is now the “individualized 
exemptions” exception to Smith—fits perfectly with Smith’s emphasis on 
general applicability.134 At its root, this is because so much of the 
constitutional danger in Sherbert flowed from the dangers of discrimination 
arising from an amorphous standard being used to judge religious 
behavior.135 
Finally, any account of church autonomy must acknowledge situations 
where religious freedom will have to be subordinated to other values. Even 
at the zenith of the Free Exercise Clause, courts refused regulatory 
exemptions in cases where there was some compelling governmental 
interest, and the same principle carries over to ideas about church 
 
129 “Rules are legal norms that are formal and mechanical. They are triggered by a few easily 
identified factual matters and are opaque in application to the values that they are designed to serve. 
Standards, on the other hand, are flexible, context-sensitive legal norms that require evaluative 
judgments in their application.” Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, 82 IOWA L. 
REV. 739, 740 (1997). 
130 See infra notes 144–53 (discussing the rule–standard distinction in the context of several cases).  
131 Sherbert involved a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday (her Sabbath) and 
sought unemployment compensation benefits. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963).  
132 Yoder involved a number of Amish families who sought to end their children’s public schooling 
after the eighth grade. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). 
133 See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1109, 1121–22 (1990) (arguing that “the Smith Court’s [distinction of Yoder and its] notion of 
‘hybrid’ claims was not intended to be taken seriously”).  
134 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(“[W]here the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that 
system to cases of religious hardship without compelling reason.”).  
135 That Sherbert involved a vague standard has been largely forgotten now. Smith recast Sherbert 
simply as an equality case. But in his Sherbert dissent, Justice Harlan pointed out that there was no 
evidence that anyone had ever, for any reason, been allowed to refuse to work on Saturday and still 
receive unemployment compensation. There was no equality problem in Sherbert, but the Court 
awarded a religious exception anyway because of the vagueness of the rule. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 
420 & n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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autonomy.136 Individuals cannot involuntarily sacrifice their neighbors as 
part of their religious observance—and neither can churches (even if the 
sacrifices were voluntary).137 Churches obviously have no license to 
sexually abuse children.138 Every constitutional right is exercised within 
bounds, and any theory that hopes to have some practical reality must take 
practical reality into account. Church autonomy is church autonomy within 
limits, and no more. 
The question of when the government’s interest in regulation 
outweighs the interest in church autonomy is a question that admits of clear 
answers only in clear cases. This raises an important concern about the 
appropriateness and difficulty of judicial interest balancing.139 This concern 
cannot be buried. Instead, the response can only be that some balancing is 
unavoidable, that the principle is worth the balancing, and that in many 
particular circumstances, sufficiently definite rules can indeed be worked 
out. Yet in the sections that follow, this Article will keep such concerns in 
mind as it tries to lay out, in as much detail as possible, a concrete and 
judicially manageable conception of church autonomy. 
A. Negligence, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and the Like 
Before we turn to the areas of disagreement, it helps to start where 
there is consensus. Courts are deeply split on many issues, but they all 
agree that the First Amendment prohibits tort claims of clergy 
malpractice.140 Some have suggested that this is just a matter of equality 
and consistent with Smith—what makes the tort of clergy malpractice 
impermissible is the fact that it applies only to clergy.141 But this cannot 
 
136 See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text (discussing the compelling interest test for Free 
Exercise). 
137 See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 
49–50 (1890) (“The practice of suttee by the Hindu widows may have sprung from a supposed religious 
conviction. . . . But no one, on that account, would hesitate to brand [such] practices, now, as crimes 
against society.”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“Suppose one believed that 
human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the 
civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?”).  
138 See infra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing the sex abuse cases). 
139 This concern is articulated well in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 126, at 133 (pointing out that “the 
[same] questions of measurement and even-handedness raised [by modern arguments for church 
autonomy were] once employed—but now abandoned—in free exercise exemption cases”). 
140 See, e.g., Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003) (“There is no such thing in the law as clerical malpractice.”); DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & 
Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 829 A.2d 38, 46 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (“[C]ourts throughout the United 
States have uniformly rejected claims for clergy malpractice under the First Amendment.” (quoting 
Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 204 (Utah 2001))); Mark E. 
Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1112 (2003) (“Courts 
have universally rejected claims of clergy malpractice.”).  
141 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Separation, Neutrality, and Clergy Liability for Sexual 
Misconduct, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1921, 1943 n.103 (“Neutrality would presumably also not recognize 
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explain it. Clergy malpractice is a form of malpractice, and malpractice is a 
religion-neutral tort. Every court in this country will let you sue your doctor 
and lawyer for malpractice, yet none of them will let you sue your rabbi or 
priest.142 Only if religion is special does this make sense. 
It is worth lingering over the reasons courts dismiss such suits. Clergy 
malpractice is a form of malpractice, which in turn is a form of 
negligence.143 And negligence carries with it certain problems. Negligence 
is, in a sense, the converse of contract. Contract imposes duties to which 
the parties themselves agreed, in circumstances where they would have 
expected legal enforcement. Negligence imposes duties that a jury 
essentially believes the parties should have agreed to, in situations where 
they certainly did not, and in circumstances where legal enforcement was 
not remotely contemplated. And by and large, the negligence tort turns over 
legal power to juries for them to decide on the legal duties they think 
appropriate to impose.144 
In the context of religious behavior, this gives juries the power to 
decide what religious beliefs, practices, and doctrines are acceptable and 
which ones are not. To be sure, juries are told about the “reasonably 
prudent” standard, and directed to balance costs and benefits. But they 
themselves decide what counts as a cost and what counts as a benefit.145 
 
civil actions based upon claims of clergy malpractice because clergy malpractice is a religion-specific 
action and is therefore not neutral.”). 
142 There may be one exception in Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991), which left open the 
possibility of such a claim. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical 
Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1816 n.100 (discussing Faber). 
143 “After all, malpractice is nothing but a species of negligence.” Michael Sean Quinn, The 
Advice-of-Counsel Defense: A Response to Fischer, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1498 n.39 (1994); see also 
Rubens v. Mason, 387 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[L]egal malpractice is a species of negligence.”); 
DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 471 (4th ed. 2011) (“Medical 
malpractice is a species of negligence.”). Some think of malpractice as slightly different from 
negligence in terms of the standard of care. In a negligence action, the defendant is judged by a 
reasonable person standard; in a medical malpractice action, she is judged by a reasonable doctor 
standard. See 3 WILLIAM W. BASSETT ET AL., RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 11:53, at 
11-280 to -281 (2013) (noting that “[t]he differentiating characteristic between ordinary negligence and 
malpractice is that malpractice is measured on a higher standard” because in malpractice cases the 
“defendant has a special form of competence that creates a different standard of care than that of the 
reasonable layperson”). Yet this does not distinguish malpractice and negligence because even in 
garden-variety negligence cases, the standard of care rises with the skills and capacities of the 
defendant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).  
144 Kenneth Abraham notes that “[n]o matter how negligence is defined in instructions to the jury, 
or in the law applied by a judge in a bench trial, the negligence standard is abstract and general,” and so 
“[w]ithin wide bounds, the finder of fact does not identify a pre-existing norm, but simultaneously 
determines for itself what would constitute reasonable behavior under the circumstances and then 
applies this norm to the situation at hand.” Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 
54 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1191 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
145 See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common 
Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 435 (1999) (“That the issue of breach is put to the jury even when facts 
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Many religious actions and doctrines seem strange or incomprehensible to 
the general populace. Juries drawn from the general community will not 
see the benefits of religious beliefs and practices the same way as those 
inside the church. If they did, they would belong to the church! Every jury 
will do some discounting. Some jurors will be skeptical; others will be 
hostile. If you see religion as having little value, any cost or risk will be 
enough to tip the scale in favor of liability. If you see religion as having no 
value, any allegation of cost or risk will be enough. This cannot be squared 
with the First Amendment. The First Amendment protects the free exercise 
of religion. It does not protect the free exercise of religion when it is 
reasonably prudent. We have many religions in this country that some jury 
will find imprudent. The obnoxious, the hypocrites, the discrete and insular 
minorities—they get to practice their religions too. 
The first American case of clergy malpractice involved a young man, 
Kenneth Nally, who suffered from depression.146 He went to the pastors at 
his church for counseling. They tried to get him to go to a psychiatric 
hospital and to trained secular psychologists, but he refused and ended up 
committing suicide. His parents brought suit against the church, alleging 
that the pastors should have counseled Nally better and done a better job 
trying to get him into nonreligious counseling.147 They were especially 
angry that Nally’s pastor told him that suicide would not endanger his 
salvation: “[A] person who is once saved is always saved,” he said.148 
Dismissing the case on nonconstitutional grounds, the California Supreme 
Court held that the church owed no legal duty to Nally. But it added that 
any sort of duty here would “stifle all gratuitous or religious counseling,”149 
thus making it “quite possibly unconstitutional.”150 
Similar to Nally is the DeCorso case, discussed supra, about the 
Jehovah’s Witness who had been in an abusive marriage. DeCorso sued her 
church, claiming that she would have left her husband years earlier had it 
not been for the church’s teaching about the immorality of divorce. Both 
Nally and DeCorso involve terribly tragic injuries. But they also involve 
plaintiffs who seek control over church teaching. Some Evangelical 
Protestants teach the perseverance of the saints; the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
teach the immorality of divorce.151 This is their right. “The government 
 
are free of doubt shows that in negligence law independent value is put on the jury deciding what is 
reasonable conduct when the normative issue is open to debate.”). 
146 See Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); 3 BASSETT ET AL., supra note 143, 
§ 11:53, at 11-284 (footnote omitted) (“Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley was the first 
clergy malpractice case ever filed in the United States.”).  
147 See Nally, 763 P.2d at 952–53. 
148 Id. at 952 (statement of Pastor Thomson). 
149 Id. at 959. 
150 Id. at 960. 
151 For another case akin to DeCorso, see Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001). In Franco, a fourteen-year-old child recalled that, when she was seven, an 
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may not . . . punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be 
false.”152 Or, even more eloquently: 
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of 
their religious doctrines or beliefs. . . . [I]f those doctrines are subject to trial 
before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be 
done with the religious beliefs of any sect.153  
That these cases even exist proves how the bare right to believe one’s faith 
and teach it to others can still be controversial. 
It is important to stress one other point. Courts and commentators 
frequently suggest that the motivating principle here is that courts lack 
competence to come up with the standard of care.154 This can be a problem, 
but it is not the real problem.155 A Seventh-Day Adventist sues her Seventh-
Day Adventist high school, claiming that she “was subjected to an inferior 
and substandard Biblical Christian education.”156 The court should dismiss 
this claim (and it did).157 But it is not out of an inability to come up with a 
 
older boy in her church congregation had sexually abused her. Her parents asked church leaders what to 
do; they advised her to “forgive, forget, and seek [a]tonement.” Id. at 201. Her parents did that, but later 
changed their minds and went to the police. They then sued the church for the heightened emotional 
distress due to the delay, and for the emotional distress due to being ostracized by the church 
community for not taking the advice. Id. 
152 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
153 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1944). 
154 See, e.g., F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 703 (N.J. 1997) (“[S]uch a [malpractice] claim 
requires definition of the relevant standard of care [and] [d]efining that standard . . . would require 
courts to identify the beliefs and practices of the relevant religion and then to determine whether the 
clergyman had acted in accordance with them.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 142, at 1823 (“Courts have 
good reason to reject claims of clergy malpractice when such claims invite the court to determine the 
standard of pastoral care for a ‘reasonable Catholic priest’ or a ‘reasonable Orthodox rabbi’ [because] 
[t]hese are judgments that only that particular religious tradition can render and are precisely the kinds 
of appraisals that the doctrine of ecclesiastical immunity bars.”). 
155 Admittedly, in some cases, the problem grows severe. E.g., Lightman v. Flaum (Lightman I), 
687 N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999), rev’d, 761 N.E.2d 1027 (N.Y. 2001) (Lightman II). In 
Lightman I, a wife told two rabbis that she was seeing another man and that she was no longer engaging 
in the ritual purification required by Jewish law (failing to do so meant that she would not have to have 
sex with her husband). The rabbis told the husband, and in response the wife sued them for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and other claims. The trial court let these claims proceed, saying that the 
rabbis’ actions were “outrageous and most offensive,” that “no member of the clergy . . . would dare 
breach the sanctity of his or her office to make public th[is] type of confidential, private disclosure[],” 
and that “neither defendant had a ‘religious obligation as a Rabbi’ to make public what had been 
imparted to them.” Lightman I, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 569–70. But on appeal, the rabbis indeed indicated that 
they had a religious obligation to tell the husband of the wife’s infidelity. See Lightman II, 761 N.E.2d 
at 1029. Rather than try to resolve this debate about Jewish law, the New York Court of Appeals 
dismissed the case on other grounds. Id. at 1033.  
156 Houston v. Mile High Adventist Acad., 846 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (D. Colo. 1994) (quoting the 
plaintiff’s complaint).  
157 Id. (“[M]y adjudication of whether Andrea was provided an adequate Biblical Christian 
education in accordance with the tenets of the Seventh Day Adventist church is barred by the [F]irst 
[A]mendment.”).  
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standard of care. If we did not care about religious liberty, we would just 
turn it over to the lawyers to inform the jury about Seventh-Day Adventist 
theology and the reasonable expectations of Seventh-Day Adventists 
sending their kids to high school. But no court would do that. No matter 
how clear the standard of care for religious education happens to be, it is 
simply not something that the government enforces. If you do not like the 
religious education provided by your religious school, you have options. 
You can explain to your children how the school is wrong theologically; 
you can push for change internally; you can petition the higher church 
authorities (if there are any); you can find a different religious school; or 
you can send your kids to public school. But you cannot get the 
government to force the school to teach your version of Christianity, 
because you have no right to control the religious education of all the other 
children at that school. 
This is not just about religious beliefs and religious teachings—it is 
about religious practices as well. Consider Kubala v. Hartford Roman 
Catholic Diocesan Corp.158 Kubala involved a type of Catholic charismatic 
healing service, in which congregants would approach the altar to be 
prayed over by a priest. They then would rest in the spirit, falling back into 
the arms of a catcher. Dorothy Kubala had attended these services at this 
church for years. According to her complaint, during one service, she came 
under the influence of the Holy Spirit while at the altar and fell back, but 
was not caught properly. She hit her head and was badly hurt.159 She 
brought suit, claiming several ways in which the church was negligent. The 
church should have conducted the service with people sitting or kneeling 
rather than standing, it should have put pads down around the altar, it 
should have warned people more explicitly about the dangers inherent in 
resting in the spirit, it should have selected better catchers, and it should 
have had better training for the catchers that it used.160 All in all, she 
claimed that the priests and the church “failed to utilize that degree of care 
and skill or diligence ordinarily exercised by charismatic priests and 
churches in the Catholic Charismatic Revival.”161 The Connecticut Superior 
Court dismissed the case on First Amendment grounds, saying that the 
plaintiff’s claims were all “based on the defendants’ allegedly negligent 
performance of the healing ritual,” and that “[t]he performance of a 
religious healing ritual certainly falls under the types of doctrines and 
practices which the [F]irst [A]mendment is designed to protect.”162 
 
158 41 A.3d 351 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 38 A.3d 1252 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012). 
159 Id. at 354–55 (summarizing the facts and concluding that Kubala “suffered severe and painful 
injuries as a result”). 
160 Id. at 355, 363. 
161 Id. at 355.  
162 Id. at 357. 
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Kubala illustrates all the dangers that can arise from thoughtlessly 
applying regular tort rules to constitutionally protected behavior. The 
plaintiff probably sees this case as easy. She was injured, the church caused 
her injuries, and so the church should pay. But her suit really claims that 
the healing service here was illegal. That is strong language, but it is the 
right language. Torts are illegal acts.163 Tort liability is government 
regulation, legally indistinguishable from a civil fine.164 If Dorothy Kubala 
wins this case, it is a judicial declaration that the way the church conducted 
this healing service was illegal. And it will threaten charismatic healing 
services everywhere. 
To be sure, neither Kubala nor any other plaintiff will claim that all 
charismatic healing services are illegal. They will simply say that this 
charismatic healing service was not done right. But this is a problem with 
regulation-by-tort: if a jury imposes liability, it will be unclear what exactly 
the church needs to do to avoid liability in the future, because it will be 
unclear why the jury imposed liability in the first place. Is it enough that 
the church puts a warning in the bulletin? Is it enough that the church lays 
down pads around the altar? A statute that laid out criteria for Catholic 
charismatic healing rituals would be unconstitutional.165 But it would be 
better than handling this through tort law, because there is no safe harbor in 
tort law. Whatever precautions the church takes, the next jury may well 
find them insufficient. Lurking in the background, of course, is the reality 
that some juries will see any precautions as insufficient. They will not say 
this; they may not even consciously think it. But juries drawn from the 
outside world will have a hard time seeing the benefit of charismatic 
worship, and any injured plaintiff will be proof enough that the practice is 
too dangerous. The safe course for the church will be not to have any sort 
of charismatic healing service at all. But this chilling effect would intrude 
deeply on First Amendment freedoms—it would transform worship in the 
denominations that conduct these services. 
This is not to say that Kubala is an easy case. There is an important 
difference between cases challenging church beliefs and those challenging 
church practices. We all still believe, as Jefferson did, that there is a 
difference between beliefs and acts.166 Maybe, all things considered, 
 
163 See Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 345 (1879) (“[T]he very essence of a tort is that it 
is an unlawful act . . . .”). 
164 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 n.17 (1996) (“State power may be 
exercised as much by a jury’s application of a state rule of law in a civil lawsuit as by a statute.”). 
165 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (“At a 
minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue . . . regulates or 
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”). 
166 In his letter to the General Assembly of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson wrote: “That to suffer the 
civil Magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of [religious] opinion, and to restrain the profession 
or propagation of [religious] principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy, 
which at once destroys all religious liberty . . . That it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil 
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recovery is justified in Kubala. My problem is with courts that fail to 
appreciate what is at stake. There is a case whose facts are almost identical 
to Kubala, where liability was upheld on appeal without the appellate court 
detecting even the slightest constitutional problem.167 
Intentional infliction of emotional distress creates similar kinds of 
problems. If negligence permits the free exercise of religion only when 
reasonably prudent, the emotional distress tort permits the free exercise of 
religion only when not overly offensive. In some sense, the emotional 
distress tort is even more dangerous to constitutional values. Negligence 
traditionally required some sort of physical or economic impact; the 
emotional distress tort never did.168 Juries can impose liability on almost 
any act they find sufficiently outrageous.169 This has created some real 
problems, even outside the religious context.170 And within the religious 
context, the effects have been extreme. A series of cases imposed enormous 
damages on unpopular minority groups, usually Scientologists and Hare 
Krishnas, for what juries claimed were improper methods of religious 
indoctrination.171 The lesson here seems to be that “given the opportunity to 
assess damages against religious organizations and officials for religiously 
motivated ‘outrageous’ conduct, juries do so with gusto.”172 
Many religions teach and do things that outsiders find outrageous. 
Everyday acts of church discipline, for example, seem outrageous to 
outsiders. Churches enforce certain standards, and expel or punish those 
who fail to meet them. Some shun those who have extramarital sex,173 or 
 
government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good 
order . . . .” 5 PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 77 (1987). 
167 See Dadd v. Mount Hope Church & Int’l Outreach Ministries, No. 278861, 2009 WL 961516 
(Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2009) (upholding a jury verdict of over $300,000 to a congregant who hit her 
head on the floor while slain in the spirit, without any reference to the First Amendment). 
168 See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 56–57 
(1982) (explaining that the emotional distress tort “resembles negligence in that the defendant’s conduct 
is evaluated in terms of a vague standard,” but that there is no “requirement of a palpable, physical 
injury”). 
169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965) (“Generally, the case is one in which the 
recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the 
actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”). 
170 See Givelber, supra note 168, at 52 (“[T]hat civil liability should turn on the resentments of the 
average member of the community appears to turn the passions of the moment into law.”); see also 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (“‘Outrageousness’ . . . has an inherent 
subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or 
views . . . .”). 
171 Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated “Outrageous” Conduct: Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against “Other People’s Faiths,” 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 579, 615–
22 (1993). 
172 Id. at 617. 
173 See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987); 
Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007). 
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who speak out against the church,174 or who commit heresy.175 They do so 
for theological reasons, drawn from religious teaching, thinking it is the 
best way to encourage the expelled to reform and to protect those who 
remain. But juries will not be inclined to see religious discipline as an 
attempt to maintain social and doctrinal unity in an increasingly secular 
world. They will ask why the church could not maintain unity in some 
other way. They will ask why the church did not have better procedures to 
determine wrongdoing, why the scriptural text or church teaching should 
necessarily be read that particular way, why certain immoral acts get 
treated differently than others, and why religious groups that are supposed 
to be about forgiveness somehow cannot forgive. 
The Supreme Court, more than a century ago, said that courts must 
stay out of this business: “[W]e have no power to revise or question 
ordinary acts of church discipline, or of excision from membership.”176 
Lower courts have followed suit, dismissing emotional distress claims 
stemming from acts of excommunication and shunning.177 Some say the 
principle here is one of equality and consistent with Smith.178 But again this 
is not true. Courts in these cases do not instruct juries to ignore the 
religious dimensions to these cases; they do not try to somehow separate 
the secular part from the religious part, and then compensate only for the 
former. They simply dismiss these cases. Churches have the right to expel 
their members for the same kinds of reasons that churches have the right to 
expel their ministers. Determining whether someone was expelled for a 
good or bad religious reason is difficult. But more fundamentally, it is not 
the jury’s job to decide which religious reasons are good and which are 
bad. No one has the right to be a member of a church that does not want 
him. 
 
174 See, e.g., Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1975); Anderson v. 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., No. M2004-01066-COA-R9-CV, 2007 WL 161035 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007). 
175 See, e.g., Williams v. Gleason, 26 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. App. 2000); cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (involving a minister removed from her 
position for violating internal religious rules). 
176 Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 139 (1872). The Court continued, “[W]e cannot 
decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been regularly 
or irregularly cut off.” Id. at 139–40. 
177 See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987); 
Marks v. Estate of Hartgerink, 528 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1995); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 
(Tex. 2007); Korean Presbyterian Church v. Lee, 880 P.2d 565 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).  
178 Eugene Volokh, for example, says, “[I]f a church inflicts emotional distress on the politician by 
excommunicating him, the excommunication would be constitutionally protected under the Free 
Exercise Clause.” Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1299 
(2005). This result, he says, is required because the “emotional distress that flows from the religiosity of 
the offensive conduct, like emotional distress that flows from the content of people’s speech, may not 
form the basis of legal liability even under the generally applicable emotional distress tort.” Id.  
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To be sure, some of these claims are sympathetic and well-intentioned. 
Orthodox Jews have pointed out a very troubling problem in their own 
communities about the rules regarding divorce.179 Jewish law prevents a 
wife from getting a religious divorce without the consent of her husband. 
This, in turn, has unequal effects on the two parties. A still-married woman 
who cohabits with a new partner is seen as an adulterer, and children born 
of that union are stigmatized. But a still-married man can cohabitate 
without it being seen as adulterous, and children of that union are not 
humiliated. To some, tort law is the answer to this religious problem. Tort 
law should be used to force the husband into giving his wife a religious 
divorce.180 
But the gender inequity here is a belief and practice of Orthodox 
Judaism. Maybe it should change. But it should change because Orthodox 
Jews change it, not because the state changes it. The state does not reform 
Orthodox Judaism, even at the insistence of a substantial fraction of 
Orthodox Jews. And if Orthodox Judaism fails to change its practices, it 
may well lose members or even fall apart. But which religions survive is 
not the concern of the government. We have no established church; 
religions here do not get propped up by the state. Whether religions flourish 
or fail depends on the choices they make. The government does not punish 
them for those choices, but it also does not shield them from the 
consequences of those choices. 
Other kinds of torts, like breach of fiduciary duty, should be treated 
the same way as negligence and emotional distress claims. Insiders should 
not be able to bring suits that impinge on a church’s chosen religious 
beliefs or practices. Substance should be more important than form—
constitutional protection should not depend on the elements of state tort 
law.181 Claims that a church committed malpractice should thus be treated 
the same, whether they are styled as negligence claims, breach of fiduciary 
duty claims, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, or something 
 
179 Good introductions to this issue are Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using 
Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 
811–12 (1998), and Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial 
Agreements, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 359, 364–70 (1999). 
180 This kind of religious divorce is known as a “get.” See, e.g., Alan C. Lazerow, Give and “Get”? 
Applying the Restatement of Contracts to Determine the Enforceability of “Get Settlement” Contracts, 
39 U. BALT. L. REV. 103, 124 (2009) (footnote omitted) (discussing how “many authors have argued 
that [women denied a get] can recover from their recalcitrant husbands under the widely-accepted tort 
of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)”); see also David M. Cobin, Jewish Divorce and 
the Recalcitrant Husband—Refusal to Give a Get as Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 4 J.L. 
& RELIGION 405 (1986). 
181 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (“[A] State cannot foreclose the 
exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels.” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 
(1963))). 
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else.182 But courts sometimes falter. In a fit of formalism, courts sometimes 
label something a clergy malpractice claim when they want to dismiss it 
and a negligence claim when they do not.183 
Finally, it is worth spending a moment on claims that should not be 
barred. Claims by outsiders are unaffected by the principle of church 
autonomy, because religious groups have no right to affect nonconsenting 
outsiders. And every insider has a constitutional right to become an 
outsider.184 In the brainwashing cases against the Hare Krishnas and the 
Scientologists, tort judgments were often based on flimsy reasons.185 But if 
churches physically prevented people from leaving, liability would be an 
easy case. One difficult case involved a church member accused of 
violating a church prohibition on fornication.186 In the middle of the church 
disciplinary proceedings, she tried to quit the church. Yet the church 
refused to stop the disciplinary proceeding. She sued and won a substantial 
jury verdict.187 And on appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court generally 
agreed with the jury. The church’s actions were constitutionally protected 
up to the moment she withdrew, but the church had to immediately 
abandon the disciplinary proceedings once she abandoned the church. This 
makes sense in a certain way: no one believes that churches can continue to 
harry people who have long left the church. But at the same time, 
individuals cannot have a unilateral right to shut down church proceedings. 
One has the right to never get on a roller coaster, but one has no right to 
insist that the roller coaster stop halfway up the hill (or halfway down the 
hill, for that matter). Yet this situation sits right on the fault line. 
Finally, claims that do not impinge on the church’s religious beliefs 
and practices are not barred either. There is no problem with liability in a 
 
182 See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1438 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J., concurring) (noting that a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty is “simply an elliptical way of alleging clergy malpractice”); Schmidt 
v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[A]s with her negligence claim, [the plaintiff’s] 
fiduciary duty claim is merely another way of alleging that the [clergyman] grossly abused his pastoral 
role, that is, that he engaged in malpractice.” (emphasis omitted)); Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 
446, 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (“[W]e will not determine the justiciability of [the plaintiff’s] counts based 
upon the nomenclature used by the plaintiff . . . .”); Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter–Day 
Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 205 (Utah 2001) (“[D]espite [the] characterization of her negligence-based claims 
as gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty, we must 
deal with the real issue here—clergy malpractice.”). 
183 See, e.g., Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 387 n.5 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (“Characterizing 
plaintiff’s claim as one for ‘clerical malpractice,’ [the defendant] argues that recognizing such a cause 
of action would require the court to develop a standard of care for pastoral counseling, an undertaking 
which inevitably would violate the First Amendment . . . . However, plaintiff’s complaint alleges simple 
negligence.”). 
184 See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text (elaborating on this point). 
185 See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text (elaborating on this point). 
186 See Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989). 
187 In the resulting suit, the plaintiff was awarded $390,000 in damages as well as prejudgment 
interest. Id. at 769. 
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slip-and-fall case that happens in the church parking lot. It usually does not 
even occur to defendants in those cases to raise the First Amendment as a 
defense, and it does not matter whether the plaintiffs are members of the 
church or not.188 The clergy sex abuse cases also probably fall into this 
category, although a full discussion of those cases is impossible here.189 
B. Battery, False Imprisonment, and the Like 
Many courts, even those that dismiss negligence or emotional distress 
claims, often remark about how torts like battery and false imprisonment 
are different. Liability there, these courts suggest, should raise no 
constitutional issues.190 This common intuition makes a great deal of sense, 
but it is perhaps more complicated than commentators have suggested. 
Consider a recent decision by the Texas Supreme Court: Pleasant Glade 
Assembly of God v. Schubert.191 The case involved a seventeen-year-old 
girl, Laura Schubert, and her family’s church, Pleasant Glade Assembly of 
God.192 Pleasant Glade Assembly of God was a Pentecostal church that held 
itself out as adhering to a literal interpretation of the Bible, including the 
Bible’s passages about spirits, demons, and demon possession. One Friday, 
Laura Schubert attended a youth group event at her church. After reports 
that someone saw a demon, the youth minister led the group in anointing 
the church in oil and casting out the demons. Schubert returned to the 
church for two services on Sunday. 
The important events began with the Sunday evening service. During 
that service, Schubert collapsed to the ground, claiming that demons were 
after her. Church members then held her down as part of an exorcism. 
Schubert clenched her fists, gritted her teeth, made guttural noises, and 
 
188 See Proto v. Most Holy Trinity, No. CV095005234S, 2011 WL 2478309 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 
25, 2011) (involving a plaintiff who alleged that he “was walking back to his vehicle, which was parked 
in a parking lot adjacent to the Church, when he ‘tripped and was caused to fall and/or slip on and/or 
over a cement speed bump that was in the parking lot,’ thereby sustaining personal injuries”); see also 
Hanson v. Saint Luke’s United Methodist Church, 704 N.E.2d 1020 (Ind. 1998) (citing other cases). 
189 Others have looked at those cases thoughtfully and in detail. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 142. 
Douglas Laycock rightly points out how claims in a few of these cases would have far-reaching 
implications that would create serious religious liberty problems, but those seem to be atypical. See 
Laycock, supra note 80, at 273–74.  
190 See Higgins v. Maher, 258 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (barring claims of 
intentional defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but saying that “torts such as 
battery, false imprisonment or conversion cannot be perpetrated upon its members with civil 
impunity”). A number of other cases have similar language. See Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract 
Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 1987); Dobrota v. Free Serbian Orthodox Church, 952 
P.2d 1190, 1195 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998); Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 885 (D.C. 2002); Glass v. 
First United Pentecostal Church of DeRidder, 676 So. 2d 724, 737 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Tidman v. 
Salvation Army, No. 01-A-01-9708-CV00380, 1998 WL 391765, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 1998); 
Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 554 (Tex. App. 2006). 
191 See 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
192 For the facts that follow, see id. at 1–5. 
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sometimes demanded to be freed. She came back to the church on Monday 
and again on Tuesday. On Wednesday, similar things happened. She again 
collapsed and writhed on the floor; church members again forcibly held her 
down, praying for her and trying to help her. On both occasions, Schubert 
suffered scrapes, carpet burns, and bruises. She initially did not mention 
any of this to her parents. But eventually she did, and eventually the 
Schubert family parted ways with the church and brought suit against it. In 
a 5–4 decision, the Texas Supreme Court held that Schubert’s claims of 
assault, battery, and false imprisonment were all barred by the First 
Amendment. Its logic was similar to the Kubala case.193 Schubert was a 
member of the church, seeking to impose liability on the church because of 
what occurred during its long-established religious beliefs and practices. 
Unlike the claims in the last Part, these should go forward to a jury. 
Perhaps part of it is that the case involves physical injury, although the 
same could be said for Kubala. Perhaps another part is that assault, battery, 
and false imprisonment involve rules rather than standards, which do not 
ask open-ended questions about the reasonableness or outrageousness of 
religious conduct.194 But the best reason relates back to consent as the 
justification for church autonomy. Consent here has a double meaning and 
a double effect—it is part both of the church autonomy analysis and of the 
intentional tort analysis. If Schubert consented to the exorcism, then her 
intentional tort claims should fail for reasons unrelated to the religious 
context of her injuries. If Schubert did not consent, then her claims should 
succeed because the elements of the tort are satisfied and because that same 
lack of consent simultaneously vitiates any claim of church autonomy.195 
Schubert cannot sue about church practices in which she voluntarily 
participated. But she also has the right to leave the church at any time. An 
old case involved a Catholic priest who sued his superiors for committing 
him to a Catholic asylum where he would not be freed until he confessed 
his sins.196 Recovery in that case is easy; and recovery in Schubert’s case is 
similarly easy if the facts are as she alleges. 
Schubert’s claim should go forward, but there is still a vexing problem 
here. The culture gap between any jury and this church will be enormous. 
Texas has many Christian churches. But few Christians really believe in 
demons as a regularly occurring physical phenomenon, and even fewer 
 
193 See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text (discussing Kubala). 
194 See, e.g., Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 2008) 
(Jefferson, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that “[f]alse imprisonment does 
not require a showing of outrageous conduct” and “[e]valuating whether Pleasant Glade falsely 
imprisoned Schubert does not require the factfinder to determine the objective truth or falsity of the 
defendants’ belief”). 
195 The opinions in the case recognize this. See id. at 23 n.1 (Green, J., dissenting) (“If Schubert 
had consented to the church’s actions, the consent—under our familiar, neutral principles of tort law—
would have completely defeated her claims.”). 
196 See O’Moore v. Driscoll, 28 P.2d 438 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933). 
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conduct exorcisms. Most Christians will see this church as a cult. Non-
Christians will be equally suspicious. Yet there is an argument for consent 
here, or at least for a reasonable mistake about consent.197 Schubert knew 
about the church’s beliefs about demons, and she participated in services 
anyway. And Schubert freely returned to the church following the first 
exorcism, after having several days to reflect on what happened. Legal 
commentators are probably much more sensitive to these things than the 
average jury. But most of them have simply assumed that there is no way 
that anyone could ever have consented to this.198 This backhanded exposes 
a serious problem: The jury will not approach the issue of consent with an 
open mind. 
The best solution is not to dismiss the case outright, as the Texas 
Supreme Court did.199 But it also is not to do what the lower court did and 
what the dissent in the Texas Supreme Court suggested. They really 
believed that the case could be handled by keeping all evidence of religion 
from the jury. This is, in fact, what the lower court did. The jury “heard 
almost nothing about religion during the trial due to the trial court’s 
diligent attempt to circumvent First Amendment problems and to honor the 
court of appeals’ mandamus ruling that neither side introduce religion as a 
reason for [Schubert’s] restraint.”200 But anyone can see how this will be a 
complete failure. Taking religion out of this case makes the church’s 
actions inexplicable and even more offensive. They are now physically 
pinning someone down for no reason at all. The church cannot defend itself 
without talking about religion. But that brings us back into the religious 
thicket. 
These problems cannot be solved; they can only be managed. The best 
answer lies in a jury determination about consent, coupled with substantial 
 
197 Either would be enough to defeat liability. See Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of 
Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1069 (2006) (describing “the well-accepted apparent-
consent doctrine,” which says that “a defendant with a reasonable belief that plaintiff consents is 
absolved of liability, even if plaintiff does not actually consent”). 
198 See Thomas Clark, Exorcising Our Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A New Interpretation of Free 
Exercise in Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 350, 366 (2009) (“In 
this case there is no consent to be subjected to false imprisonment or assault at all.”); Cynthia Koploy, 
Note, Free Exorcise Clause? Whether Exorcism Can Survive the Supreme Court’s “Smith Neutrality,” 
104 NW. U. L. REV. 363, 369 (2010) (“The question presented to the Texas Supreme Court in Pleasant 
Glade was whether religious actors could be held liable for conducting a religious exercise on a church 
member when the exercise clearly satisfied the elements of a secular intentional tort.”).  
199 See Pleasant Glade, 264 S.W.3d 1. 
200 Id. at 18 (Jefferson, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). There has been a surprising amount of 
support for this idea. See Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need for a Tolerant 
First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 48 (2010) (“The trial court was able to keep evidence about the 
church’s beliefs about exorcism out of the trial, and the jury was free under tort law to conclude that 
[Schubert] had consented to her church members’ conduct and find no liability.”); Koploy, supra note 
198, at 382 (noting how “the trial court in Pleasant Glade kept the jury from hearing any religious 
testimony at the direction of the appellate court”). 
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judicial review of that determination. The Supreme Court has developed 
principles for that review in the free speech context. Courts must carefully 
separate culpable defendants from nonculpable ones.201 Courts must 
independently review the facts.202 And they must decide the sufficiency of 
those facts under a clear and convincing standard.203 This is what should 
happen in Pleasant Glade and in the other cases where similar torts are 
alleged. 
IV. CHURCH AUTONOMY AND ASSUMED LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
As we move from imposed legal obligations (such as tort) to assumed 
legal obligations (such as contract and property), the context shifts. 
Churches have no control over tort law or their obligations under it. But 
churches do have control over their contracts and property arrangements. 
The ministerial exception itself reflects this difference. Before Hosanna-
Tabor, courts agreed that ministers could not bring discrimination claims, 
but they split on whether ministers could bring contract claims.204 Hosanna-
Tabor mentions the issue, but stays away from it.205 
This Article proposes a quite different legal rule for assumed legal 
obligations. Rules of contract and property enhance autonomy; they enable 
churches to structure their affairs as they wish. In general, principles of 
contract and property should apply to churches, as they do to other 
organizations. But this creates two problems that must be explored. The 
first lies in the difficulty of discerning what the church intended its legal 
obligations to be; this will be called the “legal intent” problem. The second 
lies in the difficulties that can arise from changed circumstances; this will 
be called the “dead hand” problem. 
 
201 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918–19 (1982) (explaining that “[t]he 
First Amendment similarly restricts the ability of the State to impose liability on an individual solely 
because of his association with another”). 
202 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (“[I]n cases raising 
First Amendment issues we have repeatedly held that an appellate court has an obligation to ‘make an 
independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not 
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964))). 
203 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285–86. 
204 There are several cases suggesting that such claims should be permitted. E.g., Petruska v. 
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 311 (3d Cir. 2006); Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United 
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985). For cases suggesting that such claims should be 
barred, see infra note 207.  
205 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012)  
(“We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by 
employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.”). 
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A. Contract Cases and the Like 
Again it is helpful to start where there is consensus. In the 
employment discrimination context, courts universally dismiss 
discrimination claims brought by clergy.206 In the contract context, courts 
universally dismiss cases brought by ministers under “just cause” 
provisions of their contracts.207 Courts will not decide whether a 
congregation really had contractually sufficient reasons for firing the priest 
or the rabbi.208 Such cases involve the same pretext problem that surfaced 
with the ministerial exception—juries charged with deciding the issue of 
good cause will have to make decisions about what the minister’s religious 
duties were and whether they were done right.209 
In one sense, the contract claims are actually worse. In discrimination 
cases, the law establishes proper and improper reasons for dismissal. Sex, 
race, or being over forty are legally unjust causes; being an ex-offender, 
under forty, or a Green Party member are not.210 In contract cases, juries 
decide not only why the church let the minister go, but also what types of 
reasons are valid. Nothing here stops juries from simply overriding 
religious judgments. A church might believe that a growing religious 
school and a tight budget justify letting go of a mediocre minister with an 
alcohol problem. A jury might find all of those same facts, but deem the 
firing illegal. And, of course, contract claims pose the same classic problem 
present in Hosanna-Tabor: Someone now has a right to lead a church 
against the church’s demonstrated will. 
A natural first reaction is to question why any special theory of 
autonomy is necessary here. If churches want to avoid these just-cause 
contract claims, they should simply avoid making promises of just-cause 
employment. Contract law poses no inherent threat to church autonomy; 
 
206 See supra Part I (discussing Hosanna-Tabor and the ministerial exception). 
207 See, e.g., Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654, 655 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing a 
rabbi’s claim that under the terms of the written contract, he could only be fired for “gross misconduct 
or willful neglect of duty”); Leavy v. Congregation Beth Shalom, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1013 (N.D. 
Iowa 2007) (dismissing a rabbi’s claim that under the terms of the written contract because she could 
only be fired for “gross misconduct or an ongoing inability to perform the duties described in the 
agreement”); Kraft v. Rector, Churchwardens & Vestry of Grace Church in N.Y., No. 01-CV-7871 
(KMW), 2004 WL 540327, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2004) (dismissing a minister’s claim that under 
the terms of the written contract, she could only be fired “for cause”).  
208 See, e.g., Friedlander, 347 F. App’x at 655 (“[R]eview of Friedlander’s claims in this case 
would require scrutiny of whether she should have, inter alia, read more extensively from the Torah at 
certain services, prepared students for their Bar or Bat Mitzvah more adequately, performed certain 
pastoral services that were not performed, or followed the Temple’s funeral service policies . . . [and] 
whether any failures rose to the level of ‘gross misconduct or willful neglect of duty . . . .’”). 
209 See Lund, supra note 28, at 51–57 (labeling this the inquiry problem and unpacking it in more 
detail). 
210 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602  
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631 (2012)) (age over forty); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 
VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)) (sex and race). 
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churches just need to be careful when making commitments.211 And surely 
the vast majority of a church’s contracts will be enforced without regard to 
religion. A church’s contracts with the property insurer or the gas company 
get treated as ordinary contracts. Otherwise, churches might have a hard 
time getting insurance or getting the heat turned on. The freedom to make 
legally binding contracts is so essential that taking it away usually amounts 
to oppression. Southern states, for example, took the right to contract away 
from African Americans during slavery and after Reconstruction;212 one 
state is now trying to take it away from illegal immigrants.213 This is why 
the Supreme Court, in the very first church autonomy case, prominently 
stressed the rights of religious organizations to enter into contract and 
property agreements.214 And in some circumstances, it advances not only 
liberty, but a specifically religious liberty: most will think of it as a good 
thing that courts will enforce a Muslim husband’s promise to pay the sum 
he promised in the Mahr agreement, and a Jewish husband’s promise to 
divide the marital property according to the order of the Jewish beth din.215 
1. The Legal Intent Problem.—What then explains the fierce 
reluctance of courts to enforce contract claims that involve distinctively 
religious obligations, such as the refusal of courts to adjudicate a dismissed 
minister’s claim that he was fired without cause? This piece argues that it is 
chiefly because of what it terms the legal intent problem. In many of these 
cases, there is insufficient reason to think the parties intended or expected 
the contract to give rise to legally enforceable rights. 
 
211 Some courts have seized on this point. “[A]pplication of state contract law does not involve 
government-imposed limits on [the defendant’s] right to select its ministers: Unlike the duties under 
Title VII and state tort law, contractual obligations are entirely voluntary.” Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 
462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist 
Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“A church is always free to burden its activities 
voluntarily through contracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court.”). 
212 See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a 
Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 565 (2005) (“The inability of African-Americans to 
avail themselves of the law, whether by entering into contracts or by obtaining redress for wrongs, was 
among the hallmarks of slavery and the Black Codes.”). 
213 See Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2011, Pub. Act No. 535, 
§ 27 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-26(a) (2013)) (“No court of this state shall enforce the terms of, or 
otherwise regard as valid, any contract between a party and an alien unlawfully present in the United 
States . . . .”). 
214 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 714 (1871) (“Religious organizations come before us 
in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their 
rights of property, or of contract, are equally protected under the protection of the law . . . .”). 
215 See Lang v. Levi, 16 A.3d 980 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (upholding a decision dividing 
marital property made by of a Jewish beth din); Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 95, 98 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 2002) (upholding an Islamic Mahr agreement dividing marital property because the parties 
had agreed to it before marriage). See generally Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New 
Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011). 
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To understand this point, one must begin with how we regularly make 
promises without any expectation that they will end up in court. You 
promise your spouse to go to the grocery store; you promise the Associate 
Dean to do a better job with faculty recruiting; you promise your travel 
agent not to book online. You may intend to keep these promises. But they 
are not promises that the law will necessarily enforce. It is not that these 
promises are trivial or hastily made. No-fault divorce is the rule these days, 
even though marital vows usually rank among the most important promises 
of peoples’ lives.216 
Legal enforcement of promises, most think, should track peoples’ 
desires for legal enforcement. In a perfect world, courts would enforce a 
promise if, and only if, the contracting parties would have wanted judicial 
enforcement.217 But our world is far from perfect. Parties often do not make 
their intentions clear; sometimes they have different intentions. Even more 
problematically, parties often have no intentions regarding enforcement—
they never think one way or the other about the prospect of litigation when 
they make promises. 
In such situations, everything turns on the default. In England, the 
traditional default was non-enforcement—that is, promises were not 
enforceable without some indication that the parties intended judicial 
enforcement.218 American law flips that presumption, generally assuming 
that parties want legal enforcement of their promises unless they specify 
otherwise.219 This is where the problem lies, because it opens up the door to 
contract claims. When one looks at the cases, one sees courts constantly 
 
216 See Elisabeth Oppenheimer, No Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce, 90 N.C. L. REV. 73, 
119 (2011) (“[A]ll fifty states have adopted some version of no-fault divorce.”). 
217 See Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial 
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 943, 1022 (“In the ‘heaven of legal 
concepts’ . . . actors would not simply ‘promise’: they would ‘enforceably-promise’ or ‘unenforceably-
promise’ . . . promisees would rely accordingly, and contract law could be taught in one semester.”).  
218 See Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571 (A.C.) 579 (U.K.) (refusing to enforce a promise 
between a husband and wife because “the parties did not intend that [it] should be attended by legal 
consequences”); Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1448–50 (2009) (discussing 
the English rule).  
219 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981) (“Neither real nor apparent intention 
that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of 
intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.”). This 
somewhat overstates the matter. Other principles of contract law put limits on the kinds of promises 
courts will enforce—perhaps most notably, the requirement of consideration. See id. §§ 17, 71–81 
(discussing consideration). And there are some exceptions to the presumption of enforcement. See id. 
§ 21, cmt. c (“In some situations the normal understanding is that no legal obligation arises, and some 
unusual manifestation of intention is necessary to create a contract. Traditional examples are social 
engagements and agreements within a family group.”); see also 1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 2.13, at 190 (rev. ed. 1993) (“[I]f the subject matter and terms are not such as 
customarily have affected legal relations, the transaction is not legally operative unless the expressions 
of the parties indicate an intention to make it so.”).  
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asked to intervene in religious disputes under the flimsiest of contractual 
pretenses.220 
Perhaps the earliest and most well-known case involved a district 
superintendent who allegedly told a pastor that, if the pastor kept working 
at his current parish, he would eventually get “a congregation more suited 
to his training and skills.”221 The language was oral, nonspecific, and 
completely off the cuff. It was not a promise; it was not even a statement of 
fact—it was a statement about what the future might bring. It is the kind of 
thing people are told all the time, but the court let his breach of contract 
claim go forward.222 In a more recent decision, one after Hosanna-Tabor, a 
missionary had a written employment contract with his church that said he 
was an at-will employee. The contract specifically mentioned the 
ministerial exception as being applicable to him.223 But the missionary 
alleged that before he left the country, he was orally promised that he 
would not be fired during the first three years unless there were “lifestyle 
issues.” When he was let go, he brought suit and his case continues.224 
First published in 1784, the Book of Discipline “sets forth the 
theological grounding of The United Methodist Church.”225 It lays out 
procedures and substantive criteria for basically everything the Methodist 
church does.226 But plaintiffs regularly treat it as an 800-page-long 
employment contract. The church’s hostility to racial and gender 
discrimination becomes a legally binding promise not to discriminate;227 its 
detailed internal procedures for conducting dismissals, written in 
unambiguously religious language, become legally binding promises that 
the church must fulfill to the letter.228 
 
220 See infra notes 221–42 and accompanying text (discussing cases). 
221 See Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1359 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). 
222 Id. at 1361 (remanding for further proceedings). 
223 See Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) 
(reciting contract language that the employee’s “relationship to the IMB will be that of an ‘at will’ 
employee” and moreover that “applicable First Amendment law [will also apply], including the 
‘ministerial exception’”). 
224 Id. at 1001–02 (dismissing the state law claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction and 
sending the remainder of the case to state court). 
225 THE BOOK OF DISCIPLINE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, at v (2012). 
226 Id. (“The Discipline [i]s the instrument for setting forth the laws, plan, polity, and process by 
which United Methodists govern themselves . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
227 See id. at ¶ 425 (“[A]ppointments are made without regard to race, ethnic origin, gender, color, 
disability, marital status, or age, except for the provisions of mandatory retirement.”). This was litigated 
as a contract claim in Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church, 679 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2004). 
228 See Music v. United Methodist Church, 864 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Ky. 1993) (“Dr. Music claimed 
that a contractual relationship had been established between the parties by virtue of the Book of 
Discipline of the United Methodist Church (1988 edition), the ‘Employee Manual’ of the United 
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If accepted, these claims would never end. One dismissed minister 
claimed a contractual right to return to the pulpit because of an internal 
working policy of the church stating, “Where employees are found to be 
ineffective, counsel shall be given them . . . .”229 Another sued claiming that 
he had been fired in an improperly convened meeting and on an improperly 
seconded motion.230 These principles go beyond employment. One 
disgruntled Baptist tried to essentially appeal a parliamentary ruling of the 
Southern Baptist Convention into the federal courts.231 He had tried 
unsuccessfully to amend the slate of candidates that had been proposed, 
and then asked the court to dismiss the current executive board of the 
organization and order a new convention run under his interpretation of the 
rules. An early Supreme Court case, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, made it clear that this is inappropriate—courts should not 
inquire into whether churches follow their own procedures.232 But some 
courts ignored Milivojevich.233 Hosanna-Tabor reiterates the point, but it is 
too soon to tell whether it will be consistently heeded.234 
Finally, there are the various quasi-contractual claims—alleged 
violations of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,235 interference 
with prospective advantage,236 interference with contract,237 wrongful 
 
Methodist Church. He further claimed that appellees violated the terms of his ‘employment contract’ by 
failing to follow the procedures set forth in Paragraphs 2620–2625 of the Book of Discipline . . . .”). 
229 Pierce v. Iowa-Mo. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 534 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa 1995). 
There are other similar cases. See, e.g., Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d 468, 471 
(8th Cir. 1993) (dismissing a claim over whether a nationwide church complied with its own bylaws 
when it removed the plaintiff from its list of eligible ministers); Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 23 
A.3d 1192, 1208 (Conn. 2011) (dismissing a claim that “the archdiocese’s own policies, procedures and 
practices with respect to performance evaluations” should be read so as “to provide the plaintiff with an 
opportunity to improve her job performance prior to terminating her employment or not renewing her 
contract”); Callahan v. First Congregational Church of Haverhill, 808 N.E.2d 301, 311–12 (Mass. 2004) 
(dismissing a similar procedural claim). 
230 See Errgong-Weider v. United Congregational Church of Norwalk, No. FSTCV116009458S, 
2011 WL 5842378, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 2011). 
231 See Crowder v. S. Baptist Convention, 828 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987). 
232 426 U.S. 696, 724–25 (1976). 
233 See, e.g., Errgong-Weider, 2011 WL 5842378, at *11 n.8 (“[A] party may seek judicial relief 
based on a church’s failure to follow its own procedures” (quoting Alicea v. New Brunswick 
Theological Seminary, 581 A.2d 900, 908 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), aff’d, 608 A.2d 218 (N.J. 
1992))); Ervin v. Lilydale Progressive Missionary Baptist Church, 813 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2004) (“[T]he [F]irst and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments do not prohibit court intervention when the 
church fails to follow the procedures it has, itself, enacted.”). 
234 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 (2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“We thus held [in Milivojevich] that by inquiring into whether the 
Church had followed its own procedures, the State Supreme Court had unconstitutionally undertaken 
the resolution of quintessentially religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment 
commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of the Church.”). 
235 See, e.g., Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654 (2d Cir. 2009); Marshall v. Munro, 
845 P.2d 424 (Ala. 1993); Celnik v. Congregation B’Nai Israel, 131 P.3d 102 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). 
236 See, e.g., Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 1997). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1226 
discharge,238 unfair termination,239 and promissory estoppel.240 These are 
sometimes seen as contract claims, though they do not necessarily depend 
on any actual promise. In a suit against a Catholic seminary, a disappointed 
candidate claimed that his classmates, who he claimed were gay, had 
sexually harassed him. The New Jersey Supreme Court gave him a trial on 
his claim of an “implied contract”—his assertion that the seminary 
somehow promised him that this would not happen without making any 
specific promise at all.241 
Where courts dismiss these claims, the opinions typically talk about 
how deciding the contract claim would involve inherently religious issues 
that courts are not fit to resolve.242 This is certainly true; deciding whether 
the rabbi had been fired for “good cause” would require courts to pass on 
religious questions. But this is not the root of the problem. Imagine a rabbi 
who will not sign his employment contract without a judicially enforceable 
“good cause” clause in it. If courts refuse to enforce such clauses, the 
temple and the rabbi will be at an impasse. They should be able to put 
something in the contract, if they want, that authorizes the court to 
adjudicate the matter. Many noted legal scholars disagree with this idea. 
They claim that the immunity surrounding matters of internal church 
governance is not waivable—that courts cannot get involved in these 
religious disputes, no matter what the parties want.243 But this is unintuitive. 
If they are sufficiently clear about it, religious groups should be able to 
enlist the courts to help them resolve their disputes. 
The best explanation then for why courts hesitate to enforce these 
promises relates to expectations about legal enforcement. Parties simply do 
 
237 See, e.g., Celnik v. Congregation B’Nai Israel, 131 P.3d 102 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). 
238 See, e.g., Kraft v. Rector, Churchwardens & Vestry of Grace Church in N.Y., No. 01-CV-7871 
(KMW), 2004 WL 540327, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2004). 
239 See, e.g., Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church of Washington, 553 S.E.2d 511 (Va. 2001). 
240 See, e.g., Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 23 A.3d 1192 (Conn. 2011). 
241 See McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840 (N.J. 2002). 
242 See, e.g., Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654, 655 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[R]eview of 
Friedlander’s claims in this case would require scrutiny of whether she should have, inter alia, read 
more extensively from the Torah at certain services, prepared students for their Bar or Bat Mitzvah 
more adequately, performed certain pastoral services that were not performed, or followed the Temple’s 
funeral service policies . . . [and] whether any failures rose to the level of ‘gross misconduct or willful 
neglect of duty . . . .’”). 
243 See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J.) 
(citation omitted) (“[T]he ministerial exception, like the rest of the internal-affairs doctrine, is not 
subject to waiver or estoppel. A federal court will not allow itself to get dragged into a religious 
controversy even if a religious organization wants it dragged in.”); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment 
Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 58 n.236 (1998) (“[T]he 
objection to judicial inquiry into religious doctrine cannot be waived.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 142, 
at 1809 (“Religious entities thus possess a degree of autonomy over the resolution of internal disputes 
unlike any other known to the law, and this autonomy may not be surrendered by contract or other act 
of consent to state power.”). 
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not intend the “good cause” provision in the rabbi’s contract to be 
enforceable in a court of law. Churches mean to decide for themselves 
whether the minister was fit or unfit. That is one of their most core 
religious functions. It would be astonishing if they meant to turn that role 
over to some court. The religious questions inherent in these cases are not 
the problem; they are a symptom of the problem. The problem is that these 
promises were never intended to be judicially enforceable. 
To handle this, we need a robust doctrine of waiver. Churches should 
be allowed to waive their right of self-governance.244 But waivers must be 
intentional,245 they must be clear and unambiguous,246 and there must be a 
strong presumption against waiver generally.247 If a church and a minister 
want judicial enforcement of the “good cause” clause in a minister’s 
contract, they must say so explicitly. Perhaps some more general provisions 
in a contract could suggest waiver—a choice-of-law clause, a choice-of-
forum clause, or a liquidated damages clause. But even these should not be 
enough. Those clauses would only indicate that a lawyer drafted the 
employment contract. Absent some explicit mention of judicial resolution, 
contract claims should not go forward.248 
2. The Dead Hand Problem.—The second problem with enforcing 
religious contracts is quite different from the first, and it comes up much 
less frequently. The dead hand problem arises from the intertemporal 
nature of contracts. Contracts create obligations today that the parties will 
be legally bound to perform in the future, sometimes the far distant future. 
In the context of religious obligations, this can create knotty problems. 
Religious arbitration provides a good example. Two Jews marry, and agree 
that in the event of a divorce, a beth din (a Jewish religious court) will 
resolve all legal issues between them. Years later, one of the spouses leaves 
the faith. Years after that, they divorce. Maybe the initial agreement should 
be enforced, even after all these years, even though one party left the faith 
long ago. But there is something troubling about this.249 
 
244 See Douglas Laycock & Susan E. Waelbroeck, Academic Freedom and the Free Exercise of 
Religion, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1471–73 (1988). 
245 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 
(1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The classic description of an effective waiver of a 
constitutional right is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”). 
246 See United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“Waivers . . . to be effective, must be unequivocally expressed.”). 
247 See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 595 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (“[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.”). 
248 Maybe there is one example. See Menorah Chapels v. Needle, 899 A.2d 316, 321 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2006) (“The contract for funeral services executed in this case provided that: ‘All disputes 
involving this agreement shall be resolved in accordance with New Jersey law and may be heard in the 
Superior Court, Law Division . . . .’ Consent to resolution of this matter by a civil court thus exists.”). 
249 Some have concluded that the enforcement of such a prenuptial agreement is simply 
unconstitutional. See Paul Finkelman, A Bad Marriage: Jewish Divorce and the First Amendment, 
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Admittedly, this problem is more hypothetical than real, but it comes 
up. Consider a case like Zummo v. Zummo,250 where a marrying couple 
agrees in a prenuptial agreement to raise their children Jewish. After the 
wedding, they have three children and then divorce ten years later. After 
the divorce, the father becomes Catholic and seeks to take his children to 
Catholic services. A lower court in Pennsylvania forbade him, citing the 
prenuptial agreement. But the appellate court reversed. Much of the 
appellate opinion focuses on the difficulties of defining Judaism.251 But the 
deeper problem is that of the dead hand. Religious liberty includes a right 
to convert—a right to change one’s mind about religious matters.252 The 
father’s 1978 promise to be Jewish and raise his kids as Jews now prevents 
him in 1991 from being Roman Catholic and raising his kids as Roman 
Catholics. 
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,253 the Supreme Court addressed this 
issue in the context of free speech. Cohen involved a reporter sued for 
breaking a promise of confidentiality made to a source. The Court rejected 
the reporter’s First Amendment defense, reasoning that the reporter had a 
constitutional right to report the name of his sources, but that he gave that 
up when he promised confidentiality. Cohen is somewhat controversial; it 
was a 5–4 decision.254 But the Court’s conclusion makes sense in light of 
free speech doctrine. Enforcing promises is a content-neutral restriction on 
speech, and the Court has interpreted the Free Speech Clause to generally 
allow content-neutral restrictions on speech.255 But Cohen’s premise is not 
a universal one.256 And some religious contracts cases may indeed present 
dead hand problems so serious that courts should refuse to enforce the 
 
2 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 131, 152 (1995) (“It seems clear, however, that to compel a non-Jew to 
appear before a Jewish religious court [in this kind of circumstance], violates the First Amendment.”). 
250 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
251 Id. at 1146 (“The father is prohibited from taking his children to ‘religious services contrary to 
the Jewish’ faith. What constitutes a ‘religious service?’ Which are ‘contrary’ to the Jewish faith? What 
for the matter is the ‘Jewish’ faith? Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionist, Messianic, 
Humanistic, Secular and other Jewish sects might differ widely on this point.”). 
252 See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987) (“The 
First Amendment protects the free exercise rights of [people] who . . . convert from one faith to 
another . . . .”).  
253 501 U.S. 663 (1991).  
254 For strong criticism of Cohen, see Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the 
Cohen Maledicta that Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135 
(1997). 
255 The Court stressed the general applicability of the law in question. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669–
72. 
256 One cannot, for example, bargain away one’s constitutional right not to be enslaved. See 
Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete 
Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 430 (2006). And lower 
courts have held that women cannot bargain away their right to an abortion. See In re Baby M, 525 
A.2d 1128, 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).  
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promises in question. Perhaps Zummo is such a case, perhaps not. But in 
any event, it is not possible to draw a precise line here. Courts will have to 
simply address these issues as they arise, case by case. 
B. Property Cases and the Like 
Property law, like contract law, relies on private ordering. So property 
cases involve the same kinds of issues and tensions as the contracts cases. 
But here the Supreme Court has been active in articulating a constitutional 
framework. In a sense, this final Part brings us full circle; we return now to 
the property case that gave rise to the church autonomy principles in the 
first place. 
All of the early Supreme Court cases about church autonomy arose out 
of church schisms, where different factions of the church would claim 
ownership of the church’s real property.257 The rules of law took a long 
time to settle. They also moved from being common law principles to 
constitutional ones.258 Even now, not everything is clear. As it stands, there 
are two methods approved by the Supreme Court for states to adopt when 
handling disputes over church property. The first is the organizational 
approach of Watson v. Jones,259 in which a court resolves property disputes 
by looking to the organizational structure of the church. In a hierarchical 
church, Watson gives the property to the hierarchy; in a congregational 
church, Watson generally gives the property to the majority of the 
congregation. The second is the neutral principles approach of Jones v. 
Wolf,260 under which courts use neutral principles of law to try and resolve 
religious disputes over property the same way as nonreligious disputes. 
1. The Legal Intent Problem.—These two approaches can seem far 
apart. They can lead to different results in particular cases, which makes 
the choice between them important. On the other hand, they actually agree 
on the most fundamental principle. Courts do not independently decide, as 
some abstract matter, which of the parties is more deserving of the property 
in dispute. Instead the goal is for courts to discern the previously existing 
intentions of the parties. Before the dispute arose, the church might have 
had some understanding about where the property would go in the case of a 
schism. The goal of courts, everyone agrees, should be to recover and 
honor that understanding.261 The recurring problem in these cases, of 
 
257 See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am., 363 U.S. 
190 (1960); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 
94 (1952); Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1 (1918); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 
(1872); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
258 See Lund, supra note 28, at 13–20 (tracing this development). 
259 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
260 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
261 See id. at 614 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing the role of courts as being to “give effect in all 
cases to the decisions of the church government agreed upon by the members before the dispute arose”). 
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course, is that this understanding is difficult to discern; maybe it never 
existed at all. This is another variation of the legal intent problem. Both 
Watson v. Jones and Jones v. Wolf try to implement the church’s 
preexisting legal intentions, but discerning those intentions runs into both 
practical and conceptual problems. 
The choice between Watson v. Jones and Jones v. Wolf is difficult. 
Neither will get every case right—the question is which is better on 
average. All told, I think Watson provides the better proxy for the original 
intentions of the parties. Watson may not be perfect,262 but there have been 
some real disasters with Jones v. Wolf. Courts have awarded property to 
schismatic congregations breaking away from hierarchical churches in 
situations where it is hard to believe that is what anyone believed would 
happen ex ante.263 Students often have a hard time understanding what 
could possibly be wrong with Jones v. Wolf. The fear is simply that there 
may be a sizeable class of church property disputes where the original 
understanding was that the national church would get the property in the 
case of the split, but that arrangement was never reduced to any kind of 
secular legal writing. And this is especially plausible when one realizes 
how Watson v. Jones exacerbates such a tendency. By holding that such 
writings were legally unnecessary, Watson encouraged churches to 
abandon them. Watson thus coaxed hierarchical churches into avoiding the 
very legal formalities that Jones v. Wolf then faulted them for not having. 
Of course, Jones v. Wolf is not incompatible with hierarchical 
churches. It requires only that hierarchical churches redraft their property 
arrangements to make clear where they want the property to go to in the 
case of a schism.264 But this is so much more difficult than Jones v. Wolf 
makes it seem.265 Shortly after Jones v. Wolf, for example, the national 
Episcopal Church passed the Dennis Canon, which purported to create a 
trust in favor of the national church on all property held by any 
congregation.266 Local congregations were represented in the national 
church process, but they did not individually agree to the Dennis Canon. So 
 
262 For an example, see the analysis in Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. Meena, 19 A.3d 1191 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (treating the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in America as a hierarchical church, and giving the property to the national church under 
Watson v. Jones). 
263 See Patrick J. Schiltz & Douglas Laycock, Employment in Religious Organizations, in 
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 527 (James A. Serritella et al. eds., 2006). 
264 See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 606 (“At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they 
so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property.”). 
265 Jones v. Wolf makes it seem easy. See id. at 606 (noting that the parties “can modify the deeds 
or the corporate charter to include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church” or that 
“[a]lternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to recite an express trust in favor of 
the denominational church,” and concluding that “[t]he burden involved in taking such steps will be 
minimal”). 
266 See Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop of Episcopal 
Diocese of Ga., Inc., 718 S.E.2d 237, 251–53 (Ga. 2011) (discussing the Dennis Canon). 
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when they now secede from the national church, they make the powerful 
argument that the Dennis Canon does not apply—because, after all, they 
never specifically agreed to it.267 Local congregations see the Dennis Canon 
as an attempt by the national church to steal their property. But maybe the 
blame rests with Jones v. Wolf. If the expectation before Jones v. Wolf was 
that the national church owned the property, then Jones v. Wolf changed the 
game on the national churches. Jones v. Wolf stole their property, so to 
speak, and the national churches cannot be faulted for trying to steal it 
back. 
This is not the place to engage a full-fledged debate over the relative 
merits of Watson v. Jones and Jones v. Wolf. The point is that this whole 
debate is another manifestation of the same legal intent problem that 
surfaced in the contract cases.268 All agree that churches should be able to 
privately order their affairs as they wish, but problems arise because the 
parties’ intent is so persistently difficult to discern in hindsight. But the 
conclusion here is the same as in the contract section—for the same reasons 
that courts hesitate to enforce certain contractual promises, they should be 
suspicious of the neutral principles logic of Jones v. Wolf. 
2. The Dead Hand Problem.—Watson v. Jones and Jones v. Wolf 
deal with how to best discern the will of the church. The Mary Elizabeth 
Blue Hull case, mentioned earlier, deals with the problem of the dead 
hand.269 Mary Elizabeth involved the old English departure-from-doctrine 
rule. Under that rule, when a church splintered into factions, courts would 
give the church’s property to the faction whose beliefs more closely 
resembled the beliefs of the original church. This, the rule presumed, is 
what the original donor of the property would have wanted. One problem 
was that courts would have to make theological judgments about the beliefs 
of the various factions.270 But the rule also posed a classic dead hand 
problem: why should the original donor get perpetual control over the 
property long after his death? And in practice, the departure-from-doctrine 
rule had a paralyzing theological effect; any change in church doctrine 
 
267 See, e.g., id. at 257 (Brown, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he Dennis Canon . . . is inconsistent 
with Georgia laws in many ways since it allows the National Church to create a trust without owning 
the trust property and without any deed . . . [and with] no expressed intent of [the local church] to 
transfer its property”). This position has triumphed in some cases. See, e.g., All Saints Parish 
Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of S.C., 685 S.E.2d 163, 174 (S.C. 2009) (“[W]e 
hold that neither the 2000 Notice nor the Dennis Canon has any legal effect on title to the All Saints 
congregation’s property.”); Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., No. 11-0332, 2013 WL 4608632, at *17 
(Tex. Aug. 30, 2013) (concluding that, even if the Dennis Canon had legal effect, the Canon creates 
only a revocable trust—a trust revocable at the will of the congregation in question). 
268 See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the legal intent problem in the context of contract cases).  
269 See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (discussing Mary Elizabeth). 
270 See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 450 (1969). 
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created the possibility of a dissenter bringing suit to take control of the 
property. 
In Mary Elizabeth, the Supreme Court unanimously held the 
departure-from-doctrine rule unconstitutional, so the dead hand issue rarely 
arises now in the context of church property. But the same issue has come 
up, strangely enough, in the context of individuals and their property. 
Generally speaking, individuals can create trusts for any number of 
purposes, including religious ones.271 But the Restatement of Trusts makes 
a strange but significant exception to this general principle: 
But the use of private trusts that create financial pressure regarding the future 
religious choices of beneficiaries is a different matter. A trust provision is 
ordinarily invalid if its enforcement would tend to restrain the religious 
freedom of the beneficiary by offering a financial inducement to embrace or 
reject a particular faith or set of beliefs concerning religion.272 
The old cases—happily rare nowadays—involved children losing their 
inheritances if they departed from their parents’ religions.273 The 
Restatement takes the firm position that such trusts cannot be enforced.274 
This again is a concern about the dead hand. The authors of the 
Restatement of Trusts do not cite (and maybe do not even know about) the 
church autonomy cases. There is no mention of Watson or Mary Elizabeth. 
But that is what is really happening. Courts are making exceptions to the 
usual law of trusts to protect beneficiaries from the religious influence of 
the dead hand.275 
 
271 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 29 cmt. k (2003) (“Individuals are normally free 
during life to promote their theological views among others, and to create charitable trusts during life or 
at death to support or advance a chosen religion.”). 
272 See id. 
273 See e.g., U. S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 862 (Or. 1954) (involving a 
will that allowed the testator’s daughter to inherit when she turned thirty-two, on the condition that she 
could prove “that she has not embraced, nor become a member of, the Catholic faith nor ever married to 
a man of such faith”); In re Jamieson’s Estate, 55 Pa. D. & C. 435, 436 (Pa. Orphans’ Ct. 1946) (“I 
hereby direct that if any of my daughters or their issue at the time of my decease be members of the 
Roman Catholic Church or shall thereafter join the Roman Catholic Church, the legacy or legacies 
hereby given to such daughter, child or children or issue . . . shall lapse . . . .”). 
274 The decided cases are more split. Some courts have struck down such trusts. See In re Devlin’s 
Trust Estate, 130 A. 238, 239 (Pa. 1925) (striking down a provision that provided the legacy with 
income “only so long as he is brought up and reared in the Roman Catholic faith”); Drace v. Klinedinst, 
118 A. 907, 908 (Pa. 1922) (striking down a provision that required the legacies to remain “faithful to 
[the testator’s] religion”). Some courts have upheld them. See Lockwood v. Killian, 375 A.2d 998, 1000 
(Conn. 1977) (upholding the religious requirement in a scholarship program for “needy, deserving 
boys . . . who are members of the Caucasian race and who have . . . specifically professed themselves to 
be of the Protestant Congregational Faith,” while simultaneously striking out the racial and gender 
requirements). 
275 For a modern example, consider In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009), which 
involved a provision in a will that treated the testator’s grandchildren as deceased if they had married 
outside of the Jewish faith. The state appellate court struck the provision as violating public policy. See 
In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). But the Illinois Supreme Court upheld it, 
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CONCLUSION 
More than twenty years ago, in Employment Division v. Smith, the 
Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not entitle religious 
observers to be exempt from generally applicable laws.276 Lower courts 
apply this principle faithfully in the context of suits between the 
government and religious believers. But in the context of suits between 
religious believers themselves, courts sometimes ignore Smith. They try to 
work out for themselves what the rules should be. And although the cases 
are not completely consistent, they do reveal strange patterns—as if for 
some reason, judges hearing these cases are all subconsciously drawn to the 
same basic underlying principles, even in cases with radically different 
factual postures. 
This Article has tried to discover those basic principles, and has 
offered a unifying theory that seeks to explain them in their totality. For 
assumed legal obligations, like those of contract and property, churches 
should generally be treated like other organizations; private ordering must 
be allowed to do its job. But courts must pay attention to the legal intent 
and dead hand problems that this Article discusses. For imposed legal 
obligations (like tort or employment discrimination), courts should be quite 
hesitant about allowing insiders to bring suits challenging religious beliefs 
and practices. 
Dissenting in a case seventy years ago, Justice Jackson remarked that 
“[r]eligious activities which concern only members of the faith are and 
ought to be free—as nearly absolutely free as anything can be.”277 Despite 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, lower 
courts have embraced this idea when deciding religious disputes between 
private parties. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor 
confirms it. But what it means, and how it applies, will be an issue for all of 
us in the years to come. 
  
 
stressing that the will’s conditions had to be satisfied at the time of the testator’s death, and that there 
was therefore no future religious or marital pressure on beneficiaries. See Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 903 
(noting that the condition “operated on the date of her death to determine which, if any, of the 
grandchildren qualified for distribution on that date” and thus “[t]here was nothing any of the 
grandchildren could have done at that time to make themselves eligible or ineligible for the 
distribution”). 
276 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
277 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1234 
 
